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CRÆPTER I

miWORIQAL BACKOaOOND
That part of the northern saropean plain lying between
the Oder and Tiatula River* hietorleally 1# the area of
German-Polleh border oonfliote.

The Great Lowland plain

lies In an equatorial direction, stretching in a fan-shaped
manner from northern France into the whole of European
Russia.

Almost three hundred miles wide is the German-

Polleh border area between the Baltic seaport of Danzig
in the north and the West Beskld Mountains directly south.
A twenty to forty Inch rainfall like that of the Great
lakes region in North America and gray-brown podzollc
soils similar to the rich earth of our mid-Atlantic states
enable the inhabitants of this area to engage in profitable
enterprises.

Never rising above three hundred and twenty-

eight feet, the elevation drops to sea level near the river
banks end the Baltic coast.

To the south of the plain,

from west to east, lie the Sudeten, the Beskld, and the
East Carpathian Mountains.

The Baltic sea cuts into the

lowlands in the north, and into it flow the river systems
of the Oder and Vistula at Stettin and Danzig respectively.
At their nearest points, the Oder and Vistula are approxi
mately two hundred miles apart,

without a natural boundary,

the area is the highway between Western and Eastern Europe.

8
1$ 1# this regioQ that both Qermms and Pole# oomtemd
to be rightfully theirs•

The laok of mmtural frontiers

left open the territory between the Oder and Vistula for
migration and oonquest.

As Polish strength deollmed and

German power increased, western Poland gradually diminished
In area.

Germany controlled Polish territories, some as far

east as the Vistula and beyond, by the end of the eighteenth
century.

Thus, both nations occupied the Oder-Vistula re

gion for long periods, and consequently, each claimed
historical rights to sections at the exclusion of the other.
Because both nations have occupied the Oder-Vistula
plain, the delineation of the Germenî^Pollsh border creates
a problem.

The frontier, situated too far to the east or

west, satisfies only one group and develops Into a source
of national Irredentlsm for the other.

Loss of lend breeds

hatred, revenge, end It Is a rallying force to war.

Wheth

er or not, the world war IX settlement of the border avoids
German-Pollah friction requires, among other factors, an
Investigation of regional history.

Poland desires recog

nition of the border along the Oder and western Neisse Elvers,
If too far west, the Oder-Nelsse line will be a source of
German Irredentlsm.

An historical analysis of the border

can foretell the extent to which German discontent may
arise from the Oder-Nelsse line.

f#r$ II
Im 1740, Prm*#ia*8 tarrltory aloag the Polish border
aad Baltie 8ea oonelated of Neemmrk, Bremdeabmr#, gmmterm
Pomerania to the Oder, and the eastern aeotion of Western
Pomerania,

The Polish provinoea of West Prussia in the

north and Posen to the south aeyareted 3ast Prussia on the
Baltic from western German territory.

Before irederisk the

Great oonneoted Bast Prussia with the fatherland by eonquer*
ing the intervening corridor, an opportunity arose for ex*
pension in the south-east,

It was the war of the Austrian

Buooession that opened the door for Prussian territorial
extension,

Frederick participated in the war "in order

that he mif^t rob a neighbor whom he had premised to defeiWl."^

The neighbor robbed was Austria and the prise was

Silesia,
When Maria Theresa ascended the Austrian throne after
the death of Charles VI on October 80, 1740, the recognition
of the Pragmatic sanction by Buropean powers was necessary.
Soon after, Frederick supported Maria Theresa by confirming
his father’s recognition of the Pragmatic sanction while at
the same time offering military aid if the need should arise,
Althou^ Prussia was apparently friendly, Prusslmarmies
invaded Silesia on December 18, 1740, end while Frederick
completed a successful coup, he told Marla Theresa that he
would support the Pragmatic Sanction if she would acknow-

1.

Sir Charles Petrie, Diplomatic History. 1715-1959
(London, 1948), p. 38,

4
I W g e M s 811#*ian olalm#.

fieoause Rrane# and S a m m y sup-

ported the claims of the Sleetor Charles of Bavaria to the
Hapshurg tha^ne, Marla Theresa had no other eholee hut to
lose Silesia In an atteapt to win Prussia's aooesslon to the
Austrian oause.

In August 1748, Austria ceded Upper and
B
Lower Silesia to Prussia.
What had formerly comprised the

Austrlan-Pollsh frontier In the west, became the southern
section of the Prusslan-Pollah border.
Thirty years later, the time was propitious for the
partitions of Poland.

Conditions and events had made It so.

The weakness of the moribund Polish government, eteos&ing
from the Infiltration of Russian influence into Polish
government circles and the abuse of the liberum veto, cul
minated In the election of a Russian puppet to the Polish
throne after the death of Augustus II In 1763.

He was

Stanislaus Ponlatowskl of whom Catherine II said, "had the
least right of all and must therefore feel more indebted to
Russia than anyone else.*^

The policies of uniting all of

the Slavs and spreading the Influence of the Greek Orthodox
Church were two which dominated Russian relations with
Poland. However, Russian Interests In the Balkans diverted
Catherine's attentions, and she realized that Austria, who
had been blocked in Silesia, also had Interests In the two

2.

Ibid.. pp. 26-36.

3.

Ibid.. p. 52.

s
power Tfiouume to her northeast end southeast.

The Confedera

tion of Bar, a reform movement, started the Polish Civil War
In 1768.

Although It was quickly suppressed hy Polish re

actionaries with the aid of Busslan troops, the Insurrection
definitely threatened Russian predomlnanoe in Poland»*
The decaying Polish kingdom attracted Prussia,

Frederick

met with Joseph II of Auetrle In 1769 and 1770 end came to
the conclusions that only a partition of Poland could prevent
a general war.

Catherine soon realized the extent of

Frederick's ambitions, and she believed that the latter would
be a more valuable ally than Austria whenever Russia expanded
Into the Balkans.

While Prince Henry of Prussia visited St.

Petersburg, she suggested the partition plan which proved to
be favorable to his brother.

Consequently, on February 17,

1772, Russia and Prussia agreed to partition Poland, and
Austria joined them In August.

Frederick took West Prussia,

making East Prussia contiguous to German territory, and thus,
out off Poland from the Baltic.^
The Turkish declaration of war on Russia In 1786
lessened Russian Intrigue In Poland whose diet them adopted
a stronger constitution on May 3, 1791,

Eight months later,

however, the Busso-Turklsh war ended, leaving Russia free
to deal with her western neighbor.

Events In western

4.

Reginald W. Jeffery, The New Europe. 1789-1889
(Boston, 1911), pp. 15^-168.

5.

Ibid.

m r o p e provide# en opportunity for Catherine.
I oudgel my brain# to urge the Courts of Vienna
and Berlin to busy themselves with the affair#
of Franoe. I wish than to do this that I might
have my own elbows free. I have many unfinished
enterprises and I wish these two courts to be .
fully occupied so that they may not disturb me.
A French war was not a small possibility as time proved, for
on April 20, 1798, the Erenoh Assembly declared war on
Austria.*
Polish malcontents, who had been harbored in Russia
since the adoption of the May Constitution, formed the
Confederation of Targowioe and supported the restoration
of the old form of government.

four days later, May 18,

1792, Catherine ennounoed her support of the new confeder
ation.

On May 19, Russian troops crossed the polish border.

The weakened government appealed to Prussia, but the latter
announced that she had promised to defend the Poland of 1790
and, therefore, that there was no casus faederia.

Russia

overrdielmed opposition within six weeks and liquidated the
threat of Prussian or Austrian hegemony in Poland.

Hot

wanting Berlin and Vienna to draw together or cause them to
abandon their interest in Prance, Catherine decided not to
annex all of Poland.

The idee of a second partition

appealed to Frederick William.

In March 1792, Prussia

6.

Petrie, o^. cit.. p. 57.

7.

Jeffery, 0 £. cit.. pp. 156-157.

aad Bassia divided m*re Polish lead, sad Praseie took Damzlg,
#Drm, and Posem.®
a desperate oause, the Poles united forces under
losolusko»

Prussia end Russia sent in troops, but again and

for the last time, Poland bent before the force of the
Bueslan armies who captured Warsaw on November 8, 1794.
When the empress suggested that "the time has come, not
only to extinguish to the last spark the fire that had been
lighted in our neighborhood, but to prevent any possible re
kindling of the ashes," the existence of the kingdom of
Poland was doomed.

In the second partition of Poland,

Austria had received no territory.

Prussia had been benefi

cial as an ally as long as Poland had existed, but now her value
decreased in comparison with that of Austria in the Balkan ques
tion idiich was in the next plan of Bussien acquisition.

Oon-

sequently, Austria participated in the third partition, and
Prussia received only the territory south of hast Prussia,
called new gast Prussia.
In Central Europe, it was a fear of aissia and the
open jealousy and distrust between Austria and Prussia which
led to the three partitions of Poland.

Bach feared the ag

grandizement of the other; each was determined, in the spirit

8.

Bernard Peres, A History of Russia (New York, 1951),
p. 272.

9.

Petrie, op,. o U . , p. 60,

8
Of the age, to seoure eompeneatlon; It was Impossible to think
of Prussia and Austria oomblnlng In defense of German Inter
ests to oppose Bussls#

The October, 1795 settlement resulted

In the extinction of the kingdom of Poland, and the OermsnPollsh border was replaced by a German-Russian line,
Silesia, South Prussia, West Prussia, and New last Prussia
formed the additions between 1740 and 1795 that enlarged
the Prussian border area at the expense of Poland,
Part III
"I have two hundred thousand soldiers In the duchy of
Warsaw,” said the tsar.
It,

"Let them try and drive them from

I have given Saxony to Prussia.”^®

This was the quid

pro quo irtilch faced the Congress of Vienna In 1815.

It was

understood between the two powers that Prussia would give
up some of her Polish lands in return for Husslan support
to her claims of saxony.
occurred In 1813,

The Prusslan-Russlan agresmmit

Having overrun Russia in 1807, Napoleon

created the duchy of Warsaw out of Prussian and Austrian
lands rather than from the acquisitions of Russia whose
favor he was then seeking.

Six years later, Ihissla and

Prussia concluded the Treaty of Kallsh and at the time
11
produced the apparent felt accompli.
.

10.

Ibid.. p. 121.

11.

Ibid.. pp. 120-121.

9
The Prussian eastern border was no longer a question
to be settled by the parties dlreotly effeeted.

A ohange In

its delimitation same at a time when a eontinentel m r had
been won by several powers.

The questions of sazony and

Poland were inextrloably linked.

If an enlarged kingdom of

Poland were created, Austria and Prussia then would demand
compensation elsewhere.

Austria would be satisfied with

Italian and Illyrian gains, but it was known that Prussia
demanded the whole of saxoi^.^^
In the settlement of the Prussian-Russian problem,
the Vienna negotiators divided Into two oampa.

Prance and

Austria opposed Prussia and Russia; Great Britain assumed the
position of mediator, but later joined the courts of Paris
and Vienna.

At first there were two Austrian policies.

Metternlch'a extreme antipathy to the tsar caused him to
oppose Russia's acquiring the whole of Poland; while on
the other hand, his ministers, atedion and Gohwarzenberg,
opposed Prussia's increasing her power In the German states.
Gestlereagh discarded the Idea of restoratlng a free and
Independent Poland and worked instead for a strong Prussian
state to act as a counter with Austria In central mrope
against the possible resurgenance of French and Russian
aggression.

The situation was also complicated by the

schizophrenic character of Tsar Alexander, who at one time

12.

Harold Nioolson, The .Congress of Vienna; A Study
in Allied Unity (New fork, Ï941T, pp. Ï64-18Î.

10
thmi0k% ot hîmeelf as a great general eonqnerlng lends as far
west as the Oder and at other times visioned himself as the
benevolent and enlightened'ruler following the *moral duty'
13
of establishing am independent Poland,"
Yet it was the irrefutable login of Talleyrand that
pointed out the real danger, Russian imperialism;
Bmssia does not wish for the re-establishment of
Poland in order to loose what she has aequired of
it: she wishes it so as to acquire what she does
not possess of it. . . . Tima to re-establish
Poland in order to give it entirely to Russia . . .
and to extend her frontiers to the Oder, would mean
oreating so great and imminent a danger for Birope
that . . . if the execution of such a plan could
only be stopped by the force of aims, not a single
moment should be lost in taking them up.14
On the other hand, Talleyrand did not agree with Oastlerea#i
that a strong Prussia would constitute a valuable mke-weight
in the Biropeen balance.

Talleyrand also expressed the fear

of a strong German nation to the east:

"If the Prussian

generals obtained their desires then, Prussia would in a
few years form a militarist monarchy which would be very
IS
dangerous to her neighbors."
The sagacity of Talleyrand's
diplomacy cannot be overemphasized.

He knew that France did

not have the strength to continue an imperialistic program
at this time.

The reel danger lay with the victors, and

the rise of the unsatisfied powers of Russia and Prussia

13.

Ibid.. pp. 148-163.

14.

Ibid., p. 155.

15.

Ibid.. p. 156.

11
threatened the belene# In inrope,

#hlle Gmatlerea# wee

f o m l n g his polloy in view of reeent events, Prenoh end Anstrian policies looked to the future.^®
The Vienna settlement of central Airope was woven with
mrenoh threads.

The Bnaslan-Pmselan plan for Poland and

8a%ony was watered down so that Prussia received only tmothlrds of 8a%ony and the klngdAs of Poland was created from
the dttdhy of Warsaw and placed under the personal rule of
Tsar Alexander I.

The Polish province of Posen, taken by

Napoleon for the duchy of Warsaw, was retroceded to Prussia,
although the latter lost New hast Prussia,

for the next

century, the provinces of last Prussia, West Prussia, Posen,
17
and Silesia remained within the Prussian eastern border.
Part IV
The Poles were allowed a small measure of self-government,
and because the tsar was to be called the "King of Poland,"
foreign powers recognized the existence of Poland, in theory
at least.

Prussian-held lands bordered Poland in the west

and north for the next forty-eight years.

At the end of

this period, 1663, with the abolition of the constitution
of Congress Poland by the tsar, the kingdom of Poland in

16.

Ibid.. pp. 166-181.

17.

Ibid.

1%
theory as well a# reality heeeme extlnet.^®
Prueelan-Polleh border.

There was me

A Pruemlem-Boeelan boundary ezleted,

and that beoame a Qerman-Buaeian border, whlob lasted until
1914, after the formation of the Qermam Amplre under the
Prussian king In 18T1.
It was Polish nationalism, although for one^hundred
and fifty years uneuoeeasful In rewlwlng a free and Inde*
pendent Poland, that was the Important factor In bringing
about the creation of a German-Pollsh border after world
War I.

The first world war conflict was the opportunity

for which the Poles were waiting.

Were Austria, Germany,

and Russia defeated, an Independent Poland would have Chance
to rise.

However, because they could not fight all three

at once, the Poles decided to assist Austria rather than
Russia.

And the Russians made only vague promises and dis

missed all attempts at mediation by Great Britain, France,
and Italy as Interference in a domestic Russian question.
By 1915, Russian troops were driven out of most of Oongress
Poland, and the country was divided Into Austrian and German
19
administrative zones.
In order to obtain Polish military help, the Central
Powers proclaimed the independence of Poland on November 5,

10.

W. P. Reddaway et. al, (ed.). The Cambridge History
of Poland (Cambridge, 1941), p. 276,

19.

Ibid., pp. 126-130.

15
191@, hut without fixing its borders or selecting a king.®®
Bit two events in the early months of 1919 destroyed
Geimany’s hoped-for snocess with the Polish people.

On

Jennary 22, 1917, President Wilson told the United States
Senate that;
No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not
recognize and accept the principle that governments
derive all their just powers from the consent of
the governed, end that no right anywhere exists to
hand peoples about frcm sovereignty to sovereignty
as if they were property. I take it for granted,
for instance if I may venture upon a single example,
that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there
should be a united, independent and autonomous
Poland.21
Although there was no agreement in either belligerent
camp concerning Poland, this statement from the strongest
neutral power was not to be disregarded.

The Polish

question had been an uncomfortable one for Great Britain
and France, because their Russian ally did not favor the
restoration of a free end independent Poland.

But the

revolution in February and March of that year, resulting
in the collapse of the Tsarist regime and the proclamation
of Poland's independence by Russia gave a new meaning to
the Polish problem.

Therefore, with an ally in opposition

to an independent Poland replaced by one friendly to her,
Great Britain and France were free to back the restoimtion

20.

Reddaway, 0 £. cit.. p. 485.

21.

Ibid.. p. 488.

u
of a Polish stats.
% e oollapss of Russia and the BolshsYist paaas with tha
Oantral Powwra in Marsh, 1918, left gastam Msropa at th#
maray of Oarmany; and tha Allias, In thalr oan Intarasts,
aara eonstrainad to sat up Poland as a bsrrlar to oarman ar
te
pension.
On Jamiary 8, 1918, tha British Prima Minister,
Lloyd Oaorga, announoad support for an Indapandant Poland.
% r a a days later, tha présidant of tha United States proslaimad his Fourteen Points, of ahioh tha thirteenth daolarad:
An indépendant Polish state should be arestad, ehlah
should inolude the territories inhabited by indisput
ably Polish populations, ehieh should be assured a
free and secure access to the see, and whose politi
sai and économie independence and territorial
integrity should be guaranteed by international
aoranant.®
After the conclusion of the Brast-Litvosk Treaty, which
«maltted mention of provisions for an independent Poland,
the Polish underground forces joined the western states
against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The Paris Peace Conference opened on January 18, 1918.
During tha next four months, Lloyd George of Great Britain,
Clemenceau of France, and President Wilson of the United
States debated Issues involved in the Polish problem#

28,

Ibid.. p. 488.

88.

Ibid.. p. 488.

84.

Ibid.. p. 489.

with

18
r e # r ê to the Gemaa-Polish border, beemiee the mille# agreed
that an Independent Poland ehonld be restored, Germany and
Poland as well as the three Tietorioms powers held eonfllet*
Ing vleea.
At the oonferenee, Poland aeked that the southern
distriete of Bast Prussia, alleela and all t&f meet Prussia
Inoluding Danzig and Posen be returned to her.

The polish

delegate maintained that slzty-elght percent of the Inhabi
tants of Posen spoke the Polish language, and there were
districts In Silesia and southern Bast Prussia which contalned a majority of Polish nationals.

Although the major-

Ity group In West Prussia and Danzig consisted of Germans,
both areas were historically Polish and the seaport of
Danzig was vital to Polish economy.
Germany, receiving the conference decisions, opposed
any decrease of her eastern border by the creation of a
new Poland.

To separate Bast Prussia apd Danzig from Ger*»

many by the rétrocession of Meat Prussia and Danzig to
Poland, meant a strangulation of the German Baltic pro
vince according to the Germans.

They also Insisted that

the Polish requests contradicted the Wilsonian principle
of self-determination.^

85.

Ibid.. pp. 490-511.
|g|rlo«n ||legateg. GhspterIV, P o l a n d (NewYork.

16
Ob th® 6® 11ml tat lorn of the Oarman-Pollah border, th®
Omltad Gtatea and Framoe differed from th® Brltlah Im polley,
hlleoB baoked Pollah demanda to the full, and Olemwieeau,
bellevlmg that Poland would be a bemaflolal ally to th® eaat
of Germany, preaaed for a atrong Poland.

But Lloyd Georg#

aeeerted that eomplet® historic justice to Poland by returnIng her pre-partltloa boundarlea of 1?76 m%l#Kt create a
German Irredenta.

On the question of Poaen, th® three repre-

eentatlvea of the leading powers agreed that It should to to
Poland*

Before a solution was found, the llliea oonaented

to the Inclusion of the Covenant of the League of Nations
on April S8, 1919, In the Peace Treaty, which set up am
Instrument that the negotiators depended upon for a solu
tion of the German-Poll ah border problem.

The allies de

cided that a plebiscite In Silesia would be held since
both Germany and Poland claimed a majority In the areas.
On June 16, 1919, the Allies and associated powers said of
Danzig:
The population of Danzig Is and has for a long time
been predominately German; just for this reason, It
Is not proposed to incorporate It In Poland. But
Danzig, when a Banza Olty, like many other Hanza
Cities, lay outside the political frontiers of
Germany, and In union with Poland enjoyed a large
measure of local Indepmdence and great commercial
prosperity. It will be now replaced in a position
similar to that which It held for so many cen
turies. 27

27.

Ibid.. p. 27.

17
âmâ mrnzlg «as latematiomsll

under th# Leaga# ot

Rations.
Th# preparation# for th# pl#bl#olt# lasted too years,
and too uprising# of tha Polish population In sllaale
finally foroad tha authorltle# to oonduot th# plablaolta
In Marsh, 1921.

Th# results proved Insonslualva, and It

was daoldad to partition th# area.

However, the first

plan for partition only lad to a third raballlon whloh was
quieted by forming another plan.

This final arrangement

gave Poland Important eoUlarlea, steelworks, and faotories
but left many predominantly Polish ooal, Industrial, and
rural sommunltles under German rule.

Plablsoltes were

also held In two contested East Prussian areas In whloh
the Polish language predominated, taking plaoe at a
moment when Poland was gravely endangered by Busslan In
vasion, for the latter were near Warsaw.

Moreover rever

sing the propaganda that Poles had used In Silesia, Germany
misrepresented Poland to the predominately Protestant last
Prussian voters as s hotbed of Cathollo religious Intoleranoe.

Oonsequently, Germany won these areas.^

For the following nineteen years, East Prussia remained
separated from the rest of Germany by the Polish oontrol

88.

Reddaway, op,, olt., p. 485.

18
of the Oorrldor, which Poland had gained hy the Treaty of
Veraaillea with the addition of Poaen, and the auoeeaa of
a plehiaeite also shifted the German-Pollah border west in
Upper Sileaia.

The settlement of the German-poliah border

after the first World #ar on a purely hiatorioal baaia
meeeaaitated a reviaion to the border-line of one hundred
and fifty yeara ago in the time of Prederiok the Groat.
Until the yirat Partition, Poland had controlled weat
Prussia, Danzig, Poaen, and parts of Pomerania,

In com-

pariaon with the German occupation of these lands, the
Polish period of occupation la longer by several hundred
yeara.
When the Treaty of Versailles was signed, June 28,
1919, the negotiators did not delimit Poland's eastern
frontier.

The Supreme Oouncil of the Allied and Associa

ted Powers established provisional eastern frontiers for
Poland in Decmaber, however, on an ethnographie basis.
But both Poland end Russia refused to consider it binding.
The line was called the Gurzon Line.

After hostilities

ceased, Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine signed the Peace
Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921, by which the PollehBissian boundary lay seventy thousand square miles east
of the Ourson Line,

The territory between the Ourson

Line and the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga
contained about as many Poles as there were Ukrainians

le
amâ White ïtethealeas together.
talned a majority of Foies.

go

M û W o w end Tllme eoa-

Althoa# Baeeia and Poland

newer reoognlzed the Caraon Line as legal, it beoame an
irritating laeue that was to arlee in eorld War II.
Part T
The border of the new. Independent Poland, «aerging
frma the peaoe treatle# after the first world lAup, oon*
talned two troublesome areas, the Danzig oorrldor and the
area between the dnraon Line and Poland's eastern frontier
reoognised by the Treaty of Riga.

And Qerman and soviet

desire to regain polish territory lost after world war I
oaused the Fourth Partition of Poland in 1939,

Eitlar

elalmed that the oorrldor whloh separated last Prussia
from the Fatherland rightfully belonged to Qermany,

He

based German claims on historieal possession of the W n z i g
oorrldor sines the eighteenth oentury.

And it seemed un

natural, aooording to the Führer, that last Prussia was
separated from Germany by Polish-held territory.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1989, Germany
and Soviet Russia seoretly negotiated for the partition
of Poland.

Although Great Britain and Franoe endeavored

to ally the U.S.S.B. against Qermany, Hitler's proposals

89.

James Thomson ShotwelX and Max A. Laerson, Poland
and Russia. 1919-1945 (New York, 1945), pp. 1-15.

w
to BoViet iBssla promleeê her more gains them did the British
amd Freneh aegotletore.

The Qerman*8ovlet ao%&-eggreeelo*

past, eoholuded on M g n s t 23, 1989, provided tor peaeefhl
relations between the two for a period of ten years, eeenomlo ties, and oooperetlon In foreign polley*

In a aeeret

protocol, Qermany and Soviet Rnasia agreed to the partition
of Poland along the Plaaa, Narew, Vistula, and Ban Mvers.
Thpa, on Beptamber 1, 1989, the German armies marched
Into Poland, end sixteen daye later, soviet Russia crossed
Poland’s eastern border with the excuse of protecting the
Phlte Rnthenlans and Ukrainians from German aggression*
But the Fourth Partition of Poland lasted only until June
of 1941.

Because of a disagreement In the Balkans and

other problems whereby It was evident that the two coun
tries were unable to agree on spheres of influence. Hitler
attacked her former ally and the Fourth Partition era
ended.

30.

Great Britain, Documenta concerning German-Palish
Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between
Great Britain and deimanv 'on' Sentem^er ”
ÎSSgT”
TXâCTonT'lSg'
g ):-------- ^ --------------U . S . Department of state, Documents from the
Archives of the German Foreign Office. Na%19
Sovi ei ''
leXat ions i '
.

CKAPTgR II
THE WARTIME REQOTIATIOKS AffECTIRO THE QEBMAg-POLiaB BORDER
Part I
After Hitler^ turned his war maohlae against the
U.S.&.R. on June 22, 1941, end the Japanese fleet attacked
Pearl Harbor, the United states, Great Britain, and soviet
Russia informally allied In mutual defiance of German ag
gression.

"Win the war" and the "unconditional surrender

of Germany" became the military goals.^
jectives were not so clear.

Bit the peace ob

Differences over the Polish

question foreshadowed the complete breakdown of frontier
agreements in peacetime.

Great Britain, the soviet Union,

and the United States were allied, but with regard to
Poland, it was a "strange alliance."®

1*

Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) started working in German
politics in 1918. He founded the Rational socialist
movement in Germany, 1925, which helped him attain
power in 1933 as Chancellor of Germany end Head of
State the following y w r .

B.

The decision requiring "unconditional surrender of
Germany," to which Churchill assented, was made at
the Casablanca Conference by Roosevelt. Robert E.
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (Raw York, 1948),
p.

5.

John R. Deane, The s t r a n æ Alliance (The Story of
Our Efforts at wartime Co-operation with Russia)
(lew York, 194717^

*%
Abowt al% w##k# after the German atteek on soviet Baeeie,
the latter Aeolared that "the soviet-German treatiee of 1#39
relative to territorial changea In Poland" were Invalid.*
Great Britain alao announced that aha had not reoognlaed
any changea la Poland'a bounderlea effected alnce Anguat
of 1959.*

Soviet Buaala reveraed her poaltlon In Deeembar,

1989, however, when Stalin * aaked for the recognition of
the Soviet boundarlea aa they eere before the German attack
In 1941.*

A poaltlon from which the U.S.S.R. never retreated,

the soviet claim to aeventy-two tbouaand aquere mllca of
eastern Poland was the main cauae of the poat-war OermanPollah border problem#
The United State# and Greet Britain had no poet war
policy for Poland In 1941, other than the nebulous guaran
tee of the Atlantic Charter, point two of which reads:
"They desire to see no territorial changes that do not
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
c o n c e r n e d . A l t h o u g h Soviet Buaala previously had agreed

4.

Polish m b a a a y in Washington, Polish-Soviet Relatione.
1916*1948. Official Documents, fn. a.i. on. lôf-ltÜQ.

5.

Ibid.. pp. 108-109.

Ô.

Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich,(1879-1963% was one of
the leaders of the October Revolution of 1917. As
Marshall of the Red Army, he was promoted to
Généralissime In 1943. He held these offices In
Soviet Ruasla; General secretary of the Communist
Party and President of soviet Council of Ministers.

7,

william L. Heumen, Making the Peace (Poundatlon for
Foreign Affairs* Washington, D. '6., 1980), p. 18.

8.

Ibid*. pp. 19—30.

23
to the prlaeiples of the Charter, she did mot oomslder the
erpreoslon of a desire as blmdlmg; mor did Great Britain#
Fearing a Rneeo-German ramproashment& the British oonduoted
negotiations with the n.g.B.R# during the winter and spring
of 1942, whloh might have oulmlneted In Britain's official
recognition of the soviet boundary olalme, but the Onlted
States Insisted that territorial agreements be postponed,

g

By the failure of three power agremaent for Soviet Russia's
post-war annexation of eastern Poland, the spirit of the
Atlantic Charter was thus maintained.
In March, 1943, however, it was evident that Russia's
atm to keep her 1941 western boundaries had not changed.
The Foreign secretary of G r w t Britain, Anthony Bden,^^
reported to President Roosevelt^ that Prime Minister
12
slkorskl
of the Polish government-in-exl1# in London
desired the annexation of East Prussia to Poland.

9.

Under

Ibid.. pp. 19-20.

10.

Anthony M e n , Rt. Hon., (1897), was secretary of
state for Foreign Affairs, 1935-1938, when he resigned
In protest of British appeasement to Germany.
1940-1945, he was again secretary of State under
Churchill.

11.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, (
-1945), was president
of the United States, 1933-1945, nominated for the
VIce-Presldency in 1920, and served as Governor of
Hew York, 1929-1933. He published his public papers
and addressee.

12.

General Wladyslaw Slkorskl, ^881-1943) was CommanderIn-Chief of the Polish Army, 1940-1943. As Prime
Minister of the Pollsh-exlle-Government in London,
he was noted for hie desire to compromise with the
aussiens without becoming subservient.

IS
@oa#ultatiom# Maxim Litvinov# Soviet embaeeedop to tho United
Stetee, emnonneed that the U.s.s.a. eonld airport Poland*#
hid for gaat Pruaaia,

But hia govamwant, however, vented

to keep the Soviet position from Polish offioiala in order
to nae it in bargaining vith them at the peaoe table.

The

soviet# planned to beak Polish annexation of Seat Pmaaia
in return for feoognition of the Ouraom Line.

Roosevelt

and M e n favored Polish inoorporetion of Raet Pruaaia, but
of Soviet aims in eastern Poland, they neither verbally
approved nor objeoted.^^
Betveen Poland and the U.s.s.R., hovever, relation#
grew more strained.
in January, 1948.

The first territorial argument oocurred
On the 9th, the polish government informed

the soviet Union that:
the inoluaion of Lvov among "other Ukrainian cities"
amnt be the result of a misunderstanding, for frma
the historical point of view end from that of in*
ternatlonal lav, end as far as the ethnological
constitution of its population is concerned, Lvov
vas and remains a Polish city.^®
The soviet government bluntly replied with the following
note;
• * . , dhila finding it impossible to enter into a

13.

Maxim Litvinov, 0L876) a Deputy People’s
Oomaissar for Foreign Affaire, he vas soviet
Ambassador to the United States, 1941*1943.

14.

Reuman, 0 £. cit.. p. 81.

15.

Polish fflnbassy, og,. oit.. p. £06.

#6
dlsousslon on the hletorloal and legal baaea on whloh
the olty of Iwow or any other town In the terrltorlee
of the Ukrainian 88R and the White Rnthenlan
be-*
long to the Union of soviet soolaliet lepnbllos, the
People’s Oommlaaar deems It his duty to Inform the
%nbaeay that In future he will not be able to aeoept
for oonel derat Ion Motes of the Mabaaay eontalnlng
doelaratlona of this kind.16
The tone of the note ref looted Soviet ©ont ©apt for a
powerleee Pollah government.

Regerdleae of the Pollah*

soviet agreement of July 30» 1941, whloh abrogated the
German-Sovlet pact of 1939, the U.88.H. did not oonelder
the former ae binding.

As an insult to Poland, aa a

threat to her imdependenoe and territorial Integrity, the
Soviet note dlotated terme upon whloh Polish-soviet rela
tions were to be oonduoted.

And thus, despite former

deolaratlone to the contrary, soviet Buaala, In 1948,
claimed her aoqulaltlona of the fourth partition.
There were other clashes during the rest of the year.
A military agreement had provided for the formation of a
Polish army on soviet soil to fight with the U.8.S.R.
against Germany.

In December, the Soviet government

stopped recruitment for the Polish army on the ground
that Poles were refusing to fight Germans.

The Soviet

implication that the Polish govermaent was pro-faaelet
was denied, and Poland declared that her army could m t
attack without supplies promised by the U.S.S.R.^^

16.

Ibid.. p. 807.

17.

Ibid.. pp. 186-146.

The

w
f ml Imre to mrmmt# a Foil mb army b a h l M Baaalaa llmea amd
the peralatemt soviet éemmmolatlorn# of the Loadoa govern»
meat provoked the Polish note of February 8b, 1943, whloh
affirmed that:

neither before the outbreak of

thle ear nor during it has the P o U e h nation ever agreed
to any eo»operatlon elth the Germane agalnet the soviet
U n i o n . The Pollah army had tried to eo»operate with
the U.B.8.R., and Poland repudiated the soviet "malleloue
19
propaganda."
The Polish Army problem never was resolved,
and It proved to be an Irritating disagreement that strained
Polish-Soviet relations.
With regard to the boundaries, the polish note eontinned:
It Is absolutely absurd to suspeet Poland of inten
tions to base the eastern boundaries of the polish
Republle on the pmelper and the Blaok Sea, or to Im
pute to Poland any tendencies to move her frontier
farther to the east . . . from the moment of the eonoluslon of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941,
the Polish Government has maintained . . . the status
# o previous to September 1, 1939, is in force; . . •
this attitude . . . is in conformity with the Atlantic
Charter.
The soviet reply reasserted that the anti-soviet policy of
the Polish govermaent advocated the "partition of the Ukrain
ian and Blelo-Russian lands In faimur of the policy of

18.

Ibid.. p. 808.

19.

Ibid.. p. 208.

20.

Ibid., p. 208.

«T
plimâ«rlng the Ukrainien and Bialo-Bnsaian people#;" and
the Pole# eere violating the Atlantic Charter.
By Poland insisting on the recognition of her pre-war
frontiers, she did not contradict the spirit of the Atlantic
Charter.

With the abrogation of the fourth partition

treaty, Great Britain, Poland, and the Soviet Union recog*
nlned Poland*# frontier# idilch Included Ukrainian and thite
Bu##ian population#.

By the Atlantic Charter teim#, Poland

did not have to relinquish territory, unless it was the
will of those within her eastern border.

The Charter im

plied that the wishes of the people concerned were to be
expressed through a plebiscite supervised by disinterested
parties and not held by the Soviets alone as was the ple
biscite in Poland after the fourth partition.

Until a

plebiscite, under the auspices of the allies, could be
held after the war, Poland's insistence on maintaining her
1939 borders was legally correct.

B»wever, the soviet

accusations were merely a part of the policy to discredit
a stubborn government which did not acquiesce to a diminu
tion of Polish territories.

The campaign started with the

breakdown of Polish-Soviet military co-operation and the
alleged Polish intentions to extend her borders to the
Dneiper and the Black sea.
next step.

61.

Ibid.. pp. 208-209.

And the Katyn affair was the

28
On ##v#n different ooaaaioas between oetober, 1941, end
Meroh, 1943, the Polleh government meked the Soviet Union
either by note or In eonferenoe the whereaboute of fifteen
thousand pollah off1eere oeptured In 1939.

The soviet

government replied that ell Pollah offleers bad been granted
amnesty.

But the German radio on iprll 12, 1943, announeed

that a mass grave of ten thousand polish offleers had been
found near Smolensk, and the Nanis elalmed that these offl*
eere had been killed by the Russians In 1940, shen Smolensk,
lying east of the Ournon Line, was under Soviet eontrol.
On April 15, the soviet Informât!on Bureau In Moseow
announeed that ”ln 1941, Polish prisoners of war w@re
employed on fortlfleatlon work at the west of Smolensk
where they fell Into German hands after the soviet foreea
withdrew from that r e g i o n . O o n f r o n t e d by two different
stories, the Polish government asked the International Red
Cross to investigate the g r a v e s . Mosoow severed relations

22.

Ibid.. p. 43.

25.

Ibid.. p. 129. The International Red cross rolled
that they oould not Investigate without the oonsent of
all parties oonoerned, and the Soviet Union did not
agree to the proposal. However, the U.S.S.R. seat a
soviet oommlttee whloh plaeed the blame on the Germans.
The members of the oommlttee were; Professor Burdenke
(Chief surgeon of the Red Army), Chairman Alexei
Tolstoy, Nikolay (Metropolitan of Kiev,) LieutenantGeneral Oumdorov, Kolesnikov (Chairman of the exeoutlve of the Union of the Bed Cross and Red Cresoent
Sooieties), Potemkin (People's Oomaissar for Muoatlon),
General Smirnov (Chief of Medioal servioe of Red Army),
and Mellnkov (Chairman of the anolensk Regional Kxeeutlve Oommlttee). %
I6SÉS& ZlBÊH
January, 19, pp. 8-7/

29
wltb th# Polish gov»rnaeat«lB-®aEil« la Loadom on April 29,
oharging that th# Polish goTemmaat had aarar requaatad
aa explaaetlon of the affair, and that it was eo-opsratlng
aith Hitlarita Oarmaay "for the purpose of arastlag terri
torial oonaassloas" from the U.ü.a.R.^
The Poles were justified la seeking an explanation,
hut, not knowing of soYiet respoasihlllty for the Katya
massacre, the loadoa goYammaat unwittingly forced a
savaraace of relations.

Ohurchill and Roosevelt ignored

the issue in order to preserve a united force against
Qarmany,

Thus, not exposed through investigations, the

soviet Union used the Katyn affair to denounce the London
government, am action having disastrous effects for Poland.
The rupture of relations made easier the introduction of a
communist government into Poland and soviet domination
there.

24.

Ibid.. pp. 211-247.

25.

August 1952, the House of Representatives investi
gating committee, the Madden Committee, concluded
that the Russians were responsible for the Katyn
Massacre, and that the United states Administration
during World War II bad purposely covered up the
evidence for the soviet Union*a continued cooneration in the war. (Hew York Times. December 28.
1952, p. 1.)

90
Part II
At the Teheran Conference» gtalln, Churehlll, and
Baoaeveit agreed to the general disposition of polish
frontiers* although an ennonnoement was not made nntll
after the Yalta Conferenoe,*^

The Big Three decided that

Poland's eastern frontier should follow approximately the
Curzon Line, and the partitioned state would receive
German territory in the north and west as compensationfce

00*

&)pklns reports that in the discussion of the
Polish frontiers, "Roosevelt took no part."
(Sherwood, o^. cit.. p. 707.) And Hull states
that negotiations on this question were carried
on "largely by %urehlll and Stalin." (Cordell
Hull, Meawirs, Æ e w York, 104^, p. 29* j B yr m w
says, however, that at Yalta, president Roosevelt
spoke of his statement expressed at Teheran which
was that the Pollsh-Russlan border would follow
the Curzon Line, but leave Lwow and portions of
the oil fields in Poland.
(James f. Byrnes,
Frankly ^ e w York, 194^, p. 29.)
Stettlnlus concurs with Rymes, and both were at
Yalta.
(Edward R. Stettlnlus, Jr.. Roosevelt a M
^ e w %rk, IR(7,
p. 151,} Also Lane wrote; Bolotov at the Moscow
Conference, October 9-20, 1944, informed Mikolajczyk,
in the presence of Churchill, Eden, and Harriman,
that the agreement for the Curzon Line was the just
solution of the Polish frontier and Invited the three
listeners to deny his statement if it were untrue.
The three, It la reported, sat silent. Molotov
added that Roosevelt had preferred that his agree
ments on this pact be kept secret." (Arthur Bliss
Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed /Raw York, 19487* p. 50.)
Mikolajozyk. Prime Minister of the Polish govemmentIn-exlle In London at that time, was at the Moscow
meeting and gives the same report as Lane. (Stanis
lav Mikolajcgyk,
Rape of Poland, pattern of soviet
Annresslon /^ew York, liî^TT p. il.)

27.

See Appendix for text of Yalta protocol.

31
Th# we#t#rn bouaAary *aa mat Aallaeatad,

How far Polaad

oould azpand to the north and west, the three powers did
not speoify.

The eastern border, however, as defined by

Stalin, was definite, and It never ohanged.
soviet insistenoe on the reoognltion of the Ourson
Line, for whioh the O.s.s.R, had persisted sinee 1941,
eaused another Polish-Soviet oriels the month after the
Teheran Oonferenoe.

The Red Army oroaaed the Polish bor

ders on January 6, 1944, and on that day, the London
government appealed to her nationals "to enter into oooporation with soviet oommanders in the event of resun#28
tion of Polish-Soviet relations."
In reply, the TASS
agenoy stated:
First, in the polish deolaration the question of
the récognition of the O i m o n Line as the sovietPolish frontier is entirely ignored. This oan be
interpreted only as a rejeotion of the Ourzon Line.
Second, as regards the Polish Government's proposal
for the opening of official negotiations between it
and the Soviet Government, it is easy to understand
that the Soviet Goveriment is not in a position to
enter into official negotiations with a government
with which diplomatic relatione have been severed.®*
And in another note, soviet Russia offered Poland compensa
tion to her north and west in return for acceptance of the

28.

stanislew Mikolajcayk, % e
of soviet Annression (New York, 1948), pp. 270-872.

89.

Polish Government Information Ganter, Polish Facts
Figures. (New York, March 10, 1944 - April"'l^S,
5), No. 8, March 25, 1944, p. 12,

M
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Oar mm. M m # , hat th# 8ovl#t govermment oontlnm#d to d##oum##
th# Lomdom P o l # # . ^

Hmvimg mocured Chmrohlll*# amd

Roosevelt*# promis#® to support th# Ourzom Lim# et th#
peaoe oomfsremo#, th# Soviet tome was obdurate#
Th# Lomdom gov#rnmemt ##k#d th# Uoit#d states amd Great
Britain to intercede, but the U.B.G.R. refused their good
31
offices#
la the last of Jamuary, Churchill endeavored
33
to permiad# Presiier Mlkolejozyk
to agree to th# Cursom
line.

Even with the promise of compensation in the north

and west, the London government remained firm and unyielding to Soviet pressure for Polish territory#

The

govemment-ln-exile stated;
The dictatorial dmnand by the U.S.S.R# that we must
agree in advance to the recognition of the Cursom
Line as the future Polish frontier cannot be accepted
by the Polish government. The result of the converestions concerning frontiers can be realized only
after the end of the war.
However, the London Poles did compromise to strong oppo
sition with the following proposition:

30.

Mikolajozyk,

31.

Ibid.. DP. 273-277.
mgrai, 1 9 4 4 , p. a.

52.

Stanislew Mikolajczyk,
He was wartime leader
of the Polish Peasant Party and Prime Minister of
the Polish-government-in-exile in London, 1943-1944,
and became Vice-Premier in the polish Provisional
Government, 1943. Between 1945 and 1947, he led
the opposition to the Communist party in Poland,
and in 1947, he was forced to leave for his own
safety.

op

.

cit.. pp. 207-208.
The London Times Weekly Mition.
-------

Di&rlag war hoatilltiaa* we ooald oonment to a demareatlom line running eaat of Vilne and Lwow. The terri
tory weat of thia demareation line, after thia territory is freed from German oooupation, would be taken
over by the Polish government. The territory east of
the dwareation line should go to the administration
of the Soviet military authorities, with the full
participation of representatives of all Allied powers.
But /aie/ the Polish government considéra it a duty
to state that the intention of incorporation into the
Soviet Union of a part of Bast pruaaia with Eonigaberg
la against the interests of the Polish state * . .
and restrains her free access to the sea.®®
The London government earlier had asked for the addition of East Prussia to Poland.

This had been acceptable to

the U.8.8.B, in 1943, but again the soviet Union increased
her demands.

Even though the Polish government had con

sented to Russian military occupation of part of the dis
puted territory, Polish refusal to agree to the Gurzem Line
before the Polish-Soviet meeting ended hope of réconciliation
at that time.

Without a boundary agreement, the U.S.S.R.

refused to resume relations with the London government.
Throughout the rest of 1943, Ghurohill urged the London
government, in Parliament and la conference, to accept the
34
Curzon Line.
During a stormy meeting in October, 1943,
with Churchill and Stalin, Mikolajczyk learned for the first
time that Roosevelt had agreed to the Curzon Line at

35.

Mikolajczyk, 0 £. cit.

209.

34.

The London Times Weekly Edition. February S3, 1944,
IV, NO. 6, JUly IB, 1944, pp. 191-195.

M
f«ho3paa.®®

B#*au## It was a national alaotloa year, Roosevelt

had not eoimlttad himself publicly In 1944 and had left the
Intlatlve to Ghurohill.

In November, the United States

announoad that she would agree to any aettlement at whloh
Great Britain, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. a r r i v e d . Wot
Mikolajozyk to further oppose the United States, Great
Britain and the Soviet Union was Impossible.
Thera was also danger of a oommunlst soup d ’etat.
Bisala had reoognlsed the Xublln government In July and
at Mosoow had Insisted that she would deal only with that
group

Mikola jozyk reoommended his goverzment to eonoede

35.

Mikola jozyk,

olt.. p. 96.

36.

Roosevelt’s equlvooal poliolas led the American Poles
to believe that he was opposed to the Curzon Line,
After Yalta, Mr, Rozmarek, President of the PolishAmerican Congress, said that Roosevelt would not have
been supported by the American Poles If the elections
had come before the Crimean Conference. (Lane, on.
fit. « pp. 60*62.) Roosevelt told Mikolajczyk, in
June, 1944, that the United States wcnild not go to
war with the Soviet Union over Poland’s eastern boun
dary, but as "arbitrator" Roosevelt would endeavor to
retain at least Lwow and the adjacent oil fields In
Poland. However, he never mentioned the Big Three
agreement on the Curzon Line at Teheran.
(Mikolajczyk, op. cit., pp. 59-61.)

37.

Lane, gg.* bit., p. 70.

3S.

The communiât Committee of National Liberation
originated as the "Union of Polish Patriots,"
December, 1941, at Saratov, under the leadership
of Wanda wasllewskl, oommnlst writer. (Mikolajczyk,
OP. clt.. p. 24.) The Soviet Union recognized the
Polish Committee of National Liberation aa the
Polish government, July 31, 1944.
In December, 1944, the lublln government proclaimed

99
thft Omrtom Line issue*

Both the polish underground and the
39
London group refused however, end the premier resigned.
fhe new gowemment formed was known to be m)re anti-soviet
40
in pollop.
And thus, there was no possibility of reoonelllstlon.
(^nfllots oontinued between the London and soviet
governments while the ü.s.s.R. gained control of the in
ternal affairs of Poland,

By the time of Yalta, stalln

held the same stratégie position that Tsar Alexander I
had before the Congress of Vienna, for, at both times
Russian armies were on Polish soil.

It was the Battle of

Warsaw that Inoreased soviet power in Poland during world
War II.

As the Bed army approaohed the Polish eapital in

late July, 1944, the Mosoow radio broadeast an appeal for
the Warsaw underground to rise up end fight the Germans.
The underground army attacked German divisions in Warsaw
without allied help.

From August until January, the Soviet

army remained only six miles outside of the olty, although

Itself the Provisional Government of Liberated
Demooratio Poland, and they were formally reoognized by the U.S.S.R., January 5, 1945. (Mikolajczyk,
OP. clt.. pp. 72-73, 107.) At the Mosoow meeting,
StanTslaw Bierut miggested a coalition of the London
and Lublin governments, of whloh fourteen out of
eighteen offices would be held by members of the
Lublin group. (Ibid.. pp. 93-100.)
39.

Lane, 2 £. oit.. pp. 38-69,

40.

Ibid.

56
laadom end Werea# Pel## begged for e##l#tenee.

Brltleh end

Amerloen aid waa Impoealble wltheut p#mai##lon to land
plane# on Soviet soil whloh the U.S.S.R. denied.

After

sixty-three day#, the underground oapltulated to Germany,
and the home army was annihilated before the Red army
eroeeed the Vistula three months l a t e r . Oonaeqnently,
not only ea# the Soviet army In Poland bat also the under
ground whloh might have later opposed Red oontrol wa# Ineffestive before Yalta.
Developments shifted the emphasis from the frontiers
question to the survival of the London government,

zy the

time of the seeond meeting of the Big Three, it was a ques
tion of whether Poland was to beoome a soviet satellite,
Churehlll plaeed the blame on the Polish govemment-lmexlle.

In his opinion, had the Poles given In to the Our-

zon Line In January, 1944, the danger from the oommnlst
4£
Lublin group would never have arisen.
His judgment, how
ever, Is too harsh.
Polish stubbomess was understandable.

To give up half

of the area of Poland for undefined and possibly lesser
portions In the north and west was undesirable, espeolally

41*

Polish Government Information Center, Polish gaots
and PI mures. (Hew York, March 10, 1944 - AprlT*W7
Î Ü 5 Î , Mo. 10, October 10, 1944.

42.

The London Times Weekly Edition. Hovcmber 1, 1944,
p. 8.

8?
after Soviet luesia*» further demande for half of m e t
frueeia la the Konlgeberg area#

Wat 11 the Moeeoe oonfer-

eaee la Oetober, 1944, the position of the United States
was equlvoeel.

Ae long as there was a possibility that

the United states would oppose Soviet territorial expan
sion, the Polish goverxmeat believed in the possibility
of a better settlement, beesuse It was not until after the
Teheran agrewwat beoame known that Mikola jozyk urged his
government to oompromlse#

But by then It was too late.

The lublln group had been reoognlzed by the U,s#s,R,

Had

Poland kept ellent about the Katyn maeaaore, in am effort
to remain friendly with Soviet Russia regardless of terri
torial oonoesslons demanded, she would have had to aoquleeoe to Soviet eontrol la northern Hast Prussia, loss
half of her land, and suffer the less of the majority of
A%
her young Intelllgentla at Katyn and the Battle of Warsaw#
For these losses, Poland was to be oompensated with an area
half the size of her forfeitures la the east.

To an ethnie

group, surviving since the eighteenth century, only by stub
born protest, these submissions would have been Impossible
as long as Poles had some hope of a better settlement. Had
the London i^verment known In February, 1944, of the Big

45.

The Polish underground was opposed to ceding terri
tory east of the Gurzon Line to the Soviet Union.
(Stanislew Mikolajczyk, T M Rape of Poland, pattern
BQFlet Amesslon /EewTwrk, I 9 % C PP. Rai-Hl. j
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Three âeeleiom, it might have eeiq^romleed with soviet Rueeie
them.
It le queetlomeble, however, that the soviet Umiom would
have reemmed relations without additional oomoeeeiooe from
Poland,

After the first slash over the Polish-soviet bor

der in 1942, the U.S.S.R. wee det«mined to dlaeredit the
London government and foroe a eubmisaion.

soviet B w e i a

sailed the govemmemt-in-ezlle «Faesist" before the Katyn
affair.

As early aa 1942, the soviet Union had shown an

unwillingness to oo-operate with the London government.

If

Poland had not protested the Katyn maeaaore, soviet Russia
would have oontinued with demands until the Polish govern
ment was subservient or foroed out by a oommunlst soup
44
d*etat suoh as ooourred In Rumania after Yalta.
U.S.S.R.
wanted a ^friendly government" In Poland, and that meant
Soviet diotated oommunlsm.
The Anglo-Ameri sen polioy during the war was to keep
allied unity against Germany at all oosts.

During 1943,

after it was known that Russia wanted eastern Poland, the
Foreign Relations Committee in the United states senate
rejeoted a resolution that the "Allies should seek no post
war territorial aggrandisements. "*** The oommlttee was

44.

Byrnes, o^,. olt., pp. 52-53*

45.

Arthur H. Vandenberg, % e Private Papers of Senator
Vandenbera (Boston, I s M ) ,
52-oK ''
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afraid that apposition might force the soviet Union to join
Oermany.*^

fhe Allies were winning the war, hut Great

Britain and the United States were losing the peace to
Soviet imperialism#
Part III
At the Yalta Oonferenoe, convened from Pehruary 4 to
11, 1945, the settling of the Polish question was one of
the most Important problems.

The creation of a new Polish

government had top priority over the frontier question.

Be

cause the United States and Great Britain continued to re
cognize the London government and the Soviet Union rejected
that group in favor of the Lublin Poles, a new government,
acceptable to all, had to be formed.
Aaglo-^erlcan policies for Poland compromised between
Polish and Soviet extremes.

# i l e refusing to recognize

the Lublin government, Churchill and Roosevelt wore will
ing to form a new interim government with representatives
of both W n d o n and Lublin Poles,

fhe combination made no

difference to the U.S.S.R., if it allowed for communist
dominance.

And the ambiguous phraseology of the Yalta

protocol that permitted the Lublin group to control the
new Provisional government and eventually subjugate all of

46.
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folmmâ.
The eeekaee# of $h# Imita agreement elth regarë te
Pelend lay In the mlepleeed Anglo-Amerlearn emphmele em the
eerde, "Imeleelem* eed "reergamieetlem.'*

The United statee

delegation urged that demeeretle leedere frwa Poland e:^
ahread ehonld net he juat Ineludad in tha Proelelonal
goremeent already eetehllmhad in Poland, hut that the
Inhlln goeemaent abould ha raorganlaad to Inelnda other
Pollah leader# eutelde end la poland#^^

Thle line of

reaeonlng, hoeeear, eaa Inaffeetlea to loanre equal etatua
for both groupa In the nee government.

"To reorganlne and

Inelnda" la a vague term %%at had amny Intarpretatlona.

hy

reeogmnlng tha Inhlin group aa tha Provlalonal government
Inataad of nalng the London Polaa aa a baala for raorganlna*
tion, tha three poaara aoeentnated the Importanee of tha
Inhlin government.

And ahem the Inhlin government eaa re

organized tha folloalng spring with tha inolnalwa of ii
oretlo Pole# from Poland and abroad, the oomnumlata held
the offlelal p oaar.^

49.

gdaard B. utattlnlua, Jr., Booaevalt and tha Buaelana.
the lp*lta Oonferano# (haw lorS, ilill, pp. lll-fli.
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Mlkolajoayk, jgg, oit.. pp. &4-B5. Thirteen out of
the twenty-oaa offloaa were held by the Inhlin Polaa.
The Important poaltlon# were given to the Inhlin
group an followas Freaidanoy to gtanlalau* Bierut;
Prime Mini atry to M a a r d Oaohka-Moraaakl; Plrat
Deputy Prmnlerehlp to aladalaa Oomulka. Mlkolajenyk
was Beooud Deputy Prmaler and Minister of igrleulture
end inxMI Reform. (Ihld.. pp. IBl-lBB. )
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Th#
tlame.

of th# matter# however, #entered @a the #1##heeeeee the mew Polish ProTlsioasl Qowermemt of

Matioaal Umlty was to be temporary# free eleetloas w«p#
to allow the Foies to ehoose their own govermmemt.

Bit

CWrehlll mad Booeewelt failed to provide aâé#@t# maehim»
eiqr to gaaramtee the holding of Are# eleetloas.

There

were only promise# whloh ebald mot be oaforead.

The faite

deelaratiom statedi
To foster the eomditioms la whloh the liberated peoples
may exereise those rights# the three goverameats will
jointly assist the people la any Biropeam liberated
state or former Axis satellite state in Birop# where
in their jadgememt eomditioms require
(a) to establish eomditioms of iateraal pease;
(b) to earry out emergemey measures for the relief
of distressed peoples;
(e) to form interim governmental authorities broadly
representative of all demooratio elements la the
population and pledged to the earliest establish
ment t h r o n g free alestions of governments respon
sive to the w i n of the people; and
Id) to faeilitate where aeoessary the holding of sash
eleetioms.
#ien# la the opinion of the three goverameats, eomditiens la any mropean liberated state or any former
Axis satellite state in gurope make suoh aetlon
aeoessary to diseharge the joint reapomsibllities
set forth in this deolaration. 49
yalflllmeat of Orimeaa pledges hinged on the prinoiple
of allied unity.

Only if all three powers believed aetlon

in Poland aeeeesary, did oonditions exist for joint exeeution of the Yalta protoool.

49.

hither Qreat Britain, Soviet

For text of Yalta protoool regarding Poland, See
j^pemdlx.
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Btissla» er $h@ ¥aiteâ States ewüLd âsalare that tha polish
sitaatioa aid mot re%mira three power assistâmes#

ïïmder

the latter olremmstamoes, the Polish Provlslomal govermm m t was tree to eomtrol the eleetioms#

% e amhassadors

of the three powers did mot have amthorlty to Insist that
eleetioms he oarrled out Im a dmoeratle m m e r ,

Omly Im

the ease of hilled oplmlom eould thc^ take set lorn im Poland,
The Talta provisions» weakened hy hnglo-hmerlearn disregard
for a possible breakdown of hilled eo«<^eratlon, eo#rlsed
the polioy upon whloh #urehlll end Roosevelt plaeed their
hopes for the estebllsWent of a free and Independent
Poland,
%

the frontier problem, soviet Russia aohleved

another vletory.

Churehlll and Roosevelt had approved of

the Oirnon line previously, but at Yalta they requested
that the Polish boundary be moved east of lwow and her adjaeent oil fields#

Stalin rejeoted the hnglo-hmerleam

plan and suggested that Poland reeelve eompmsatiom for
lwow and oil fields by expanding to the Oder and western
Mel see Rivers#

Im antlelpatlom of Polish extensive ex

pansion to the Western Helsse, the hmerlean State Depart
ment reeoœ&ended to Roosevelt am alternate border,
heeordlng to the latter, Poland w u l d obtain about one
hundred miles along the Baltie Sea, Danslg, the southern
half of last Prussia (Soviet m s s l a wanted the Eonlgsberg
area), and Upper Silesia, but not as far west as the Oder

49
mâ

#el@e#.

Th# British plmm ##11 #4 for a lim*

alomg the Oâer im the morth but east of the Westerm Heise#
im the south*

W t h Ghurohill amd Roosevelt believed that

am Oder-Meiaee lime would arouse extreme Qermam irri*
itft
demtlmm*
Stalim did mot imsiet upom the Oder-Heisse
however, amd, mot reaohimg a oo^romise, the three powers
eomourred that the final dellmitatiom of the Gemam-pollsh
border would await the peaoe treaty*
The faite Comferemoe eammot be judged apart from the
milita]^ situât lorn at that time.

The western Allies had

mot reaohed the Rhine, but Poland and most of eastern
Birope lay under the eontrol of the Bed a m ^ *

A few weeks

before faite, Roosevelt told Stettimius about the atom
b<mb although it was mot eompleted.

The Amer lean delega

tion, however, deeided mot to use its umkmowm quality to
foree favorable deeisioms at the Grimeam Conferemee*
Ihrem t h o u ^ the end of the war seemed near, the United
States military staff was extrmaely anxious for Soviet
Russia to enter the war against Japan.

However, the far

Sastern oonfliot affeoted the Polish question only imdireotly, for im a seeret agreement, Roosevelt eondomed
Soviet territorial espansiom im the lUr Bast, but not im

50.
51.
52.

Stettimius, sSL*

P* 150.
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PolmmA, far her premia# to enter the ear against Japan.^
Seeretarj 8tattInina summed up the Jkeerlean attitude at
Yalta;
Am a result of the military situation, it was
question of what (kreat Britain and the United
would permit Bussia to do in Poland, hut what
two oountries oould persuade the soviet Union
aeoept,W

mot a
states
the
to

In view of the results, soviet Bussia aoeepted nothing
unfavorahle to her.

The abortive attompts of Ohurohill

and Roosevelt to Insure a demooratio government in Poland
were to affeot inglo-lmerioan polioy on the Oerman-Polish
border question for the next year end a half.

In oontrast

to the agreement for the new Polish government, the western
frontier deolaration was definite.

But it was a mistake.

Had lmglo*lmeriean representatives objested to the Oder
and Western Reisse boundary with the same firmness that
Stalin had held to the (%rzon Line, and had they substituted
at Yalta am alternate line to the east of the Oder*Reisse,
the U.S.S.R. would not have produced at Potsdam the subse
quent fait eoooffipli

with respect to the border.

there were four reasons, however, for this error;
(1}

Britii^ and American policies for the Qerman-Polish

border differed; (B)

SB.

#urohill and Roosevelt were more

D^artmemt of State, Agaemmmmnt Regarding Japan.
1940. Executive
(Washington, D.G., 1940.}

54,

Stettimius,

cit.. p. 1ÔS.
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im

e 4«moeratl@

Im

P@lmm4, ami, #v#m%mmlly, la O a m a a y thaa Im th# b o N # r
tmaatioa; (3) the t#o we#t#?a leaier# did mot eommt ®s
the hr#mkio#m of Allied malty; (4) the Bed army oomtrolled
Polaad*
Mo Vi a# the Oermam-Polleh border east of the soviet*
proposed line of the Oder-Meleee before the Polish elee
tioms, m l # t have meant the defeat of the lomdom Poles,
who were known to be basked by O e e t Britain and the
United states.

Bmt war-time Polish-soviet relations

should have been a warning of Soviet methods and the
eoneeqment breakdown of Allied eo-operatlom.

In whloh

ease, avoiding the German-pollah border question until
after the sleet lone did not aid the London poles in
winning.

However, the position of the Red army at the

time of Yalta was probably the most important fmotor.
Great Britain and the United states had no intention of
going to war over the Polish question.
The three and one-half years of war-time negotiations
between the United States, soviet Russia, and Great
Britain erposed their dlfferenees in politisai polleles,
l^vlet Russia had two goals, the Ourson Line and an
obedient Polish government.

Polish, British, and Amerlean

eounter suggestions were brushed aside in the soviet for
ward drive to seoure her western border.

Still believing

4$
là the evemtmel emergemee &f mm Imdmpmmdrnmt ?olmm&, the
tfàiteâ States amd Great Britala urged territorial eem»emee*
tlom for Pelmmd Im the north amd weat.

At Yalta# It

afaomXd have been obvloma to Ohmrohlll and Rooaevelt that
their meemlmg of a free amd Independent Poland warn differ
ent frma the Soviet interpretation.

Bad the Anglo-

A#erlearn delegatlonâ realised that they were leaving the
Germam-Pollmh frontier open for the expane ion of a soviet
satellite state, the German-Poll#h frontier qnestlom might
have been settled at Yalta.

Im exehangs for Lwow end the

oil fields, Stalin oould have agreed to a line east of the
Oder-Meisse.
fhe three power alllanee was a "strange alliamee,"
Mot so mmoh im the feet that there were dlfferenees among
the allies, but It was a strange alllanee beesuse of the
failure on the part of Ohurohill and Roosevelt to realise
that three power unity eould not be aehieved in inter
national affairs.

Soviet Russia not only wanted to se-

eure her borders but also to «mtemd them as mush as
possible.

While In offloe, Ohurohill never # v e up hope

for Poland's imdependenoe, nor did Roosevelt whose
. . . polioy toward the Soviet Umiom was In the
mature of a gigantio gamble. Mot reoognizing
fully the Ideologloal impllestions of Marxism,
he evidently believed that the Russians were suspiolous and unco-operative largely beoause the
western nations had first enoiroled them and
them treated them as outcasts. He appears to
have oonoluded that If we were to give the soviets

êf

all they waateâ, gemeremely aaâ vit haut ammr, they
might he veemea avay tram their âaagerous ideas at
voria revolmtion mad oe*operate vholehearteâly ia
the eammom emterprise at haildiag a better t&mrrawé
le vas eager to meet the aoviet leaders amd talk
things over vith them, for he was ooafident that
the foree of his personality, ommhined vith the
poverfnl position of the laited states, would sense
them to he more reasoaahle.»®
Bat the hopes of Yalta were shattered before the third
meeting of the three powers at Potsdam.

©6.

Thomas A. Bailey, Ameriem.Ayaoes Bnsaia; Ruaalan--

OgaPTXR III
1PII1E jBKIIQWIR jJKI) "TiaaE BüBWUÜKüDOlOt <)]P j&JJL,I]BD inirMT
la hi# 8tat# Qf the Umlom mddr###, om Jenamry #, 1945,
Preeidemt Boo##vel% obeerved that "the a#arer we some te
waaqaiehim# ear eaeaiee, the mere we iaewitmhly beeome coaeelem# ef dlffereaee# emeag the wieter#,"^

tithia tee year#

of laita, the ameeapreml#ia& aad divergeât pelieie# of the
aille# destroyed their post-war amity ia the eettlemeat of
Germaa mad Polish affairs*

Pelaad, the last of the liber

ated states to hold "free sad aafottered eleetioms,"
yielded to eosaamalat pressare*

Qermamy beeame a paws be-

tweea %a#t mad West, sad a pesos treaty with her seemed
remote ia Jaaaary, 1949.

the hrsaMowa of fear power 00 -

operatlom ia oarryiag out the lalta sad Potsdam agreememts
om Germamy mad Polaad led to a ohamge ia the poll oies of
the Gaited States aad Great Britaia*

lad laglo-imerioaa

reluotaat aoquiesoeaoe oa the Oder-Heisae lime was replaoed
ia the fall of 1946 with a polioy of aoa-eooeptaaee.
Ia July, 1945, the Oder aad westera Neisse Rivers
formed the Germam-Polish border.

I.

Gailatorally, the soviet

(0,8. ) Departmemt of State, Departmeat of State
MIsSM*
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Omlem $r#m«f#rr#4, b#f@r# Po%#4em, territory emmt of the
Oâer-Heiese to Polish eamlmletrmtlorn*

8 tella

etete* that

the Oermaae had fled before the advaaee of the Baaalam
aray, aad that the area was without a govemmeat.

Olalm*

lag that the rear lines of the Red army needed protestloa,
the 9*8,8.R, gave thirty-aiae thousand square miles of
Germany to Polaad,

At Potsdam however, the Polish repre

sentatives admitted that at least one and a half million
Germans still remained east of the Oder-Relsse, a m m b e r
large enough to form a goveiment to maintain order.

Bat

Poles from east of the Garaoa H a # were moving la aad
pushing Germans out.
8 0 Viet

By transferring Poles westward, the

Galon aad Poland iaformally fired the German-Pollah

border at the Oder-lelsse,®
The placing of German territory under Polish adminis
trât lorn without Big Three consultation eontradloted the
spirit of Allied unity.

For the same military reasons that

had governed the Yalta Gonferenoe, however, Great Britain
aad the Gnlted states were in no position at Potsdam to
oppose Soviet polioy for Poland.

Although the three powers

reaffirmed that the final delimitation of the GermanPollsh border i m l d await the pease settlement, they
approved of Polish admlnistratlom la the following area:
. . . the former German territories east of a line
ruaalng from the Baltio sea immediately west of

R,

Byrnes, o£. alt,, pp. 79-81,
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aad thmia# along the Oder River to the
eemflaeae# of the «estera Relsee to the Ozeehoelovek
frontier, imolmdlmg that portion of Rest Pmeela met
plaeed mmder the administration of the Union of
Soviet Soeialiet Repahlio# in aeeordaaee with the
aaderetandimg reaehed at this eonferenee and laelndlng the area of the former free Oity of Dannig.
It was a soviet fait aeeomoli.

Great Britain and the United

States did not favor Polish eontrol as far west as the OderBeieae, hut they were powerless to effeetively oppose it
without going to war.

And the West would net eonslder war

heeause of the Germam-Polish border issue alone.
The Oder-Beisse line was not permanent teehnieally.
But Artiele M i l nullified the foree of that provision by
stating:
The three governments having eonsidered the question
in all its aspeets, reeognine that the transfer to
Qeranny of German populations, or elements thereof,
remaining in Poland, Oneohoslovakla and Hungary, will
have to be undertaken. They agree that eigr transfer
that takes plaoe should be effeoted in an orderly
and humane lumner.d
Poland intex^reted the above artiele as taoit permission to
expand into end expel Germans from uMesignated areas to
her m r t h and west.

Immediately, she started removimg

Germane mot only from pre-war Poland but also from German
territory under her administration.

Maintaining that the

Big % r e e would have provided for Qeiman displaemaents from
areas that were to remain German, Poland deolared that Great

5,

See Appendix.
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Ibid.
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Britaia a M the Baited State# ladireetly eupported the OderBeiese lime at Petadam.
Dariag the year after Potadam, the Baited State#, Oreat
Britaia, aad Eraaee did mot opealy object to the GeramaPolish border at the Oder-Keisse.

They erea laetraeted

their embaeaiee ia Warsaw to iaalat that deportatioa of
Germaae be effeoted la the moat humaaltarlaa maaaer
s
possible.
The Allied Ooatrol Oouaell ia aeeordaaee with
the Potsdam Deelaratloa, permitted the transfer of sevea
millloa Qermaa-speahiag people from eastern Barope to the
fomr zones ia Germamy.
said;

Aad seeretary of state Byme*^

«The set tirent agreed at Potsdam requires the

shifting of boaadariea la the Bast, aad the movmient of
several million Germans from other eouatriea.*^
Bat at the Oouaell of Poreiga Ministers ia July, 1 9 # ,
the freaoh foreign minister more aoourately expressed the
situation aad tersely remarked as follows:
The Potsdam ooaferenoe made agreements with rasp eat
to eastern Germany, whioh were provisional in priaeiple, but in fast were fundamental, and with whioh

5,

Lane, gg,. Oit.. pp. 1B6-S&7.
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James Prenais Byrnes (1879) was Seoretary of
State, 1946-1947. He served as Assooiate Justioe
of Supreme Ck»urt between 1941 and 1942, and later,
he beeame Bireotor of loonomie Stabilisation, 19421943, and Bireotor of Offloe of War Mobilisation,
1943-1946. He published, apeaking ireaklr.
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Byrnes, an* oit.. p. 89.

the Wxemh gav#rom#mt é%â m t take leme.^
The applleatloa of the ?ot#4em provleioa# to the tramefererne# of Gemaas made the tea^orary frontier final,

the

three powers woold not have allowed Poland to expel mllliona
of Oermana east of the Oder-Keisse Rivera if the area was to
remain German#
Thna, Great Britain and the United states aoeepted
defeat at Potsdam hot not willingly.

Daring the same eoam*

oil meeting, British foreign minister Bevin® stated:
. . . one of my first enperienoee, • « • was to find
myself In that Oahinet where I had to aeoede to a
new Polish frontier whioh I have never yet heen ahle
to reeonoile with the Atlantia Charter, hut whioh
the very neoessities of war at that time eompelled
me to agree to.**
The Big Three did not formally agree oa a final border.

But

Bavin meant that beoause of Artiele H I I, the area plaoed
under Polish administration was to go to Poland at the peaee
eonferenee.

#

whioh prooedure, the German-Polish border

would then follow the Oder and Western Heiese Rivers.

Soviet

Russia aehieved her goal at Potsdam for whioh she had been

8.

(U.S.) Department of State,
ponomje. Polioy
toward Germany. European series 15, Publioation
iéii (Washis^on, 1945), p. 32.
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BeVia (1861*
) had been in polities and a trade
union official sines 1929. He was Great Britain's
Seoretary of state For Foreign Affairs, 1945-1947.

10.

(U.S.) Department of State, Oooupation of G e r m ny .
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pressing sinse the Crimean meeting,

âmû Great Britain and

the United States admitted as mieh during the following
year.
The hreekdown of allied unity la Germany and the
failure of the polish Provisional government to oarry
out the Yalta and Potsdam pledges, directly affooted the
Geman-Pollsh border question.

By not formally recog

nizing the final delimitation of the frontier, the lost
held a political weapon.

And In the fall of 194Ô, thi^

reversed their policies.

In an attempt to thwart soviet

eclipse of Germany and Poland, Anglo-American policies
became firmer; the West threatened not to recognize the
Oder-Heisse line at the peace conference.
Two main factors caused the collapse of Inter-Allied
control of Germany:

the disagreement on German reparations

and the subsequent failure to treat Germany am an economic
unit.

At Yalta, the United states and the soviet Union

agreed on twenty billion dollars, fifty per cent of which
would go to soviet ihissla, as a "basis for discussion" for
11
German reparations.
The meeting of the reparations com
mission in Moscow ended in an impasse.

Soviet Russia

maintained that twenty billion dollars was the repara
tions fi#ire and not a basis for discussion.
At Potsdam, however, the three powers decided on the

11.

See Appendix for text of Yalta Agrafent.
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of roparatiom# is the form of Gormen *e##t# abroad
and removal of capital ladumtrial equipment not neoeaaary
12
for the peacetime economy of Germany,*
Becanee the fotadam
agreement alao baaed reparation# in the form of capital indnatrlal equipment in relation to her peacetime economy,
the poeaibility of placing reparation# on a dollar baaia
vaa anperceded by the later agreement.

Yet throughout 1946,

the Soviets argued that the United States had agreed at
Yalta to the figure of twenty billion dollar# a# final in
stead of as a baaia for discussion.

Therefore, the U.s.s.R,

believed ahe was entitled to eract reparation# from German
exports to make up the deficit not reached through the
value of capital industrial equipment and external assets}®
The Soviet position proved detrimental not only to
Germany but also to the occupying powers.

Germany re

quired isqiorts of food and other essentials to sustain a
healthy standard of living and meet the casts of the
occupying forces.

Because all German external assets were

eamarked for reparation, end the looted gold uncovered in
Germany had to be restored to the countries from which It
had been taken, exports based on current production were
the only means whereby Germany could be self-supporting.

IS.

See #pendix for text of Potsdam Agreement.
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M t %t the soviet# took exporte for reparations» the West
vooXâ have to flnanee German Importa.

InâlreotXy# the^

ivomld he paying Germany*a reparation bill,

for these

reasons» the Western powers Insisted that the Potsdam rape*
M t l o n plan he earrled ont#^*
% r o n g W m t the next year, the oeonpylng powers failed
to aehleve a eommon polioy regarding German Imports and
e;qport8.

fhere was no way to oheek the Soviets taking

German exports as reparations, heeause the U.s.s.H.
elosed her none to foreign observers,

without allied

unity In Germany, unilateral motion of one power meant
not only li^edlmemt to Germany*# reoovery, hut also ex
pense to the other powers.

If unifioatlon failed to

emerge, the West had no alternative but to join their
xones.
At Paris, the foreign ministers dlsoussed German
Issues.

Seoretary Byrnes presented a draft, on April 29,

for a twenty-five year demilitarization of Germany to be
guaranteed

the four powers.

He had suggested this Idea

to Molotov^^ at the London Meeting in September.

Curing a

dissuasion with Stalin, In Deoember, J^ymes thought the

14.
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Voyeheslav Mikhailovioh Molotov, (1390) was
the People’s Commissar for foreign Affairs, 19391945. He was a Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet
Union and Foreign Minister between 1945 and 1949.

#e
favored the pXaa.

mt

at Parle, Molotov re*

jeeted the *rlttem draft heeause it did mot provide for
Germam disarmament and demllitmrimatiom.
eorreet, however,

Molotov was in*

the Byrnes* draft even went farther,

by establishing a four-power oommiaaion with authority to
investigate eaeh zone.

This eonmiasion, of oourse, would

have broken down the barriers between the zones and sup
plied the Oontrol Counoil with information regarding
reparations removals from eaeh zone.

The Soviets did

not aooept the dmeriean Draft Treaty, and Byrnes warned
that reparations from the U.8. zone to the Soviet Dniom
would stop if German eoonomio unity failed.

Beeeiving

no reply, the Amerloan zone temporarily halted deliveries
to the U.G.8.B.1*
After the members reoonvened for the second half of
the Paris Gonferenoe, Molotov attaoked western polioy.
His denunciations were unique.

Disregarding the previous

ly discussed issues, he struck at the three powers with
new points.

Molotov elaimed;

the West wanted to create

an agrarian state of Germany; the West caused failure of
the reparations settlement; the West refused to plaoe the
Ruhr under four-power oontrol whioh meant that France,
Great Britain, and the Dnited States would deprive Gemany

Id.

Wot full. teact of the Draft Treaty see: (U.S.)
Department
Vol. H V ,
pp. 816-Sld,

5?
9f ttiis basis witbimt a plebiealte.

With a fimal strake,

IfôlotOT predieted that sattlemamt os a Q e m a s peaee treaty
if
vas mot is the sear future*
Molotov made it apparest that the rift had videsad
betveem last amd West.

After months of negotiations, there

was so agreement oa the reparations for Qermmny.

The west

had no intention of allowing four-power eontrol of the
Buhr when they were even forbidden information oonoerning
the soviet none.

And the West publioly objeeted to dis

memberment of the Buhr from Germany.^®

It was notieeeble

that Molotov did not suggest a plebisoite for the eastern
German border as he had for the Buhr.
Allied unity in Germany did not oonoern the U.S.S.R.
The following day, the United States offered to marge her
zone with any or all of the other zones.

Great Britain

aooepted, and the two treated their zones as one eoonomio
unit as of January 1, 194?.

franoe joined later in the

year.^®
On the other side of the Germas-Pollsh border, the

1?.

Vital meeohes o£ the ^
{New York, 195#), Vol.
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#6
Poll#h ProTlsloMl (bv#r«m#a% of Hatloaal Baity failed to
oarry out the Potodam eommltmwmte.

Vith regard to aleo-

tloaa, the potadam deelaratloa statedî
• . . the Polish Provisioaal Oovemmeat la aeeordaaee
with the deolsloaa of the Orlmea eonferenee has agreed
to the holding of free aad unfettered eleetloae as
s ^ m as possible om the basis of universal suffrage
and seeret ballot ia whioh all demoeratie parties
shall have the right to take part aad to put forward
eaadidates, aad that représentative# of the Allied
press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the
tmrld upon developments ia Poland before amd during
the eleotions.%0
Regardless of her Potsdam pledge, Poland did mot hold eleotlons for a year and a half.
The Poles as well as their oommuaist-oontrolled Provi*
sional government regarded Artiele XLtl of the Berlin
Deelaratloa as aa admission that the Oder^Reisse line was
final.

All of the Polish politisai parties basked that

line as just eoi^ensatioa for Poland*# eastern loss.

Amd

her attitude iaflueaoed Western polioy on the GermamPolish border.

Great Britain aad the Baited states re

frained from asserting that the Oder-Neisse was not final,
until it was obvious that Poland was a soviet satellite.
B1
By April 1940, Ameriean Ambassador lane
was eonviaoed that the Polii^ Provisional government was totali-

BO.

See Appendix for Potsdam text,
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Arthur Bliss Lane (1894} has been in the Baited
States Diplomatio service since 1910. B. 8.
Ambassador to Warsaw, 1945-1947. He published:
I ÊSS, W m â m J j M S È *

if
tari#a.

8&a@«

tbe United State» aad Polaad had

been me&otletiag for an eooaomio treaty amd the extenalom
of Amerloam oredlt to Poland.

Lane opposed the treaty.

An ezohaage of notes on April Ad, 1946, broa#t to oomoln*
elon negot let Iona for the art m e l o n by the gxport-Import
Bank of limited oredlt of forty million dollars to Poland,
Again, lane protested with the following note:
V h m the terroristic activities of the security Police
came to an end, when freedom of the press ia restored,
and when American citizens are released from Polish
prisons— not until then should the United states*
publie funds be used to assist the Polish Provisional
Government of Rational U n it y .M
Because of Lane*s reports, Poland pledged that ahe would
uphold the Yalta and Potsdam agreements with respect to
elections.

Poland promised to hold thmn in 1946, grant

freedom of press, and respect the rights of American
citizens.

Conditions did not change, however, because

the Provisional government maintained that it had never
broken the Yalta end Potsdam agreements in the first
place.^
On June 30, 1946, Poland held a referendum.

It was

a trial run by the #cvernment to ascertain whether the
cmamunist party would win in the coming elections,

fhe

British, French, and American kmbassies concluded before

22.

Lane, gp,. cit.. p. 237.
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Ibid.. p. 240.

*0
the vétlmg that the Pelleh Peaeamt party, the only opposi
tion to the Gommnmist party, eonld not win, slthongh it
represented e i # t y per oent of the eleetorete.

Dnring

the pre-eleetlon eesvelgnlng, the government hloeked the
Polish Peasant Party from omapaigning on equal basis with
other parties.

The polios imprisoned members of the large

party and intimidated the population.

By the time of the

refermdum, there was no doubt which party the Provisional
government favored.

After the election, the government did

not open the ballot boxes in the presence of representatives
of all parties as was prescribed by law.

The commnist

party claimed an overwhelming victory, although it was es
timated that they had been supported by less than twenty
per cent of the electorate.®^
After the referendum, Poland told the West that elec
tions could not be held until the following spring.

Know

ing that the people did not support the government, the
ccmmmnist party wanted chance to gain better contml of
the population.

The Soviet Union clandestinely backed

the Provisional government.

^

this time, it was evident

that there was no accord in the policies of the four powers
in Poland and Germmny.
A few weeks later. Bavin said of the polish frontier*
We see no reason why we should finally r ati# the

24

Ib id . ,
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240.

#1
a«88ioa of tbiB “rast territory to Poland without
helmg aatlafled that thoae aaauramoea {of Potsdam)
have heea fully carried out. we should also wish
to he assured that the Poles would he ahle to
develop this territory so that the eoonomio re*
souroes were properly used end that It did not
heoome a wilderness from whioh Germans had heen
emoluded hut whioh the Poles would he unable to
populate.®®
The mote was a warning to Poland. Unless she held free
eleotlons and permitted other freedtms, the United Kingdom
did not feel obligated to support the oder*Nelsse line at
the peaee eonferenee.
Ând on 8^t«mber

1946, Byrnes also deolared a

ehange In Amerloan polioy.

For the first time sines

Potsdam, B y m e s announoed that the final delimitation
of the frontier should await the German peaee eonferenee.
The epeelflo statement that the United states would sup*
port at the peaee settlement soviet proposals tor the
transfer to the U.s.s.B. of lonlgsherg and adjacent areas,
mphaslzes the (mission of any promise to support the
Oder-Helsse line.®®
The speeehes representing the poll el as of the United
states and Great Britain were directed to the Soviet Union
and the Polish Provisional government.

Anglo*mer 1earn

reAisal to reeognlne the Oder*Helsse line heeause of

Mew fork Times. JUly 26, 1946, p. 1.
26.

(U.S.) Department of State, Departmeat of state
Bulletin. Vol. m i , Mo. 547, puhlloatlon 2470,
September, 1946, pp. 249*251.

to me#t WQtwém

#ho*ed #

TOVMplag of poll ole## from that of euhmloelom to the
Potsdam fait aooomoli to one of open moe-aeoeptemee.
Their poeltloa m » week, hot Gezmame end Pole# did mot
take the threat lightly.
Tloe Preeldemt Oomolka^^ aaealled lyraes for hariag
the "amdaelty" to give the Oermama amy hope of frostier
retleloma.

Alao, he said that four mllllom Pole# moved

Imto the territory amd vithim a fee momthe there eomld he
#8
five mllllom.
Peaeamt party leader# Mikolalozyk#
opposed Byrmee* polioy.

The day after the Stuttgart

speeoh# Poles held a mass meeting hefore the imerloam
go
Mhaeey Im Warsaw Im protest of Amerloem polioy.
With Soviet haoklmg, Poland opposed the West with
firmmess.

On September 21, President Boleslae Biermt

so

Indireotly referred to a Polihh-Sovlet agremmint on the
border question.

He said that he

27.

Wladyslaw O m m l k a (
) m m b e r of the polish
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of the Polish Government of National ïïslty. Be
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Boleslaw Blerut (1892) Assisted reorganising
the National Ckmnoil in Poland in 1943. He was
eleoted President la 1944# president of the polish
Provisional Government, and President of the polish
Government in 1947. He Is affiliated with the
oommunlty party.

53
, . •
uaâersteaâ the mote of «##ethy emong
the Aliies toward Germmay. If there are pelitieiem#
who think they earn make ehmmges Im Polaad, they are
w r o n g , o r suoh a plsm womld have eatastrophie resuit8*^*
fhe address, at Katowioe of the Polish premier Ü ward B*
Osmhka-Morawski,^^ was mere reweallmg:

"Gemeralissimo

Stalim told us that those who wish to W&ake our westers
frontiers, whioh were set at Potsdam, would mot only have
to deal with the Polish army but also the Bed srmy."^
fh» Vest, for the seoomd time, thought there was a
Polish-Soviet treaty on the Qermssfpolish frontier,

Im

April 1945, the Department of state notified the soviet
governmemt it reoeived press and radio reports that eartain soviet-oosupied territories, imoludimg Dammig, had
been formally inoorporated imto Poland,
not speeifio.^

fhe replies were

The w p y of a Polish-Soviet treaty, re

leased to the Ameriean asd»assador at Moseow in m r e h 1945,
reveals that only the Curmon M m e was formally agreed
35
to.
But the Osubka-Morawski statement made it oleer
that Poland and the U.s.s.R. reaehed agreement on the

31.

New York Tim es. September

21,

1946,

p . 5.

Edward B. Osubka-Morawski, member of P o lis h
P a rty and P o lis h P re m ie r.
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u
w & a t 9 m border#

Aewrdlmg to Byrmee, a Polleh-Bovlet

Treaty #a# elgmed on Angnat Id# 1948, by whioh the Soviet
Union and her eatelllte reoognlmed the Oder-helaee a#
final.^

With the Soviet Union banking Poland, Anglo-

Ameriean threat# of non*reoognition held little v e i ^ t in
Warsaw.
Bnt on the other side of the border, Qerman reaction
favored western polioy,

A few days after the Stuttgart

speech, certain German# urged the people to petition the
Allied m ii t ar y government toward restitution of pre-war
boundaries between Germany and Poland.

Although the

Soviet censor in the U.s.s.h, some of Berlin refused
favorable commentary in the paper, "Weue Belt," leaders
in other zones urged that territory east of the OderHelsse be returned to Germany.
One of the purposes of Byrnes* speech was to simke
out Soviet attitude on the eve of elections In frraoh
and British zones.

Previously, the soviet government

had baited Germans with possible return of former terri
tories under tm#orary Polish administration.

At the

same time, etmuanists In Poland promised Poles a perman
ent border along the Oder-Helsse.

However, the American

3#.

Byrnes, og,. cit.. pp. 191-2.

87.

Hew fork Times. September 8# 1946, p. 11,

##
Bt&tmmmt finally #v0 keé a reply from Molotov.

He took

Poland*B aide, W t aignifioantly e m o o # delayed until
German eleotlons were ov e r . ^
flie result of these eleotlons showed eommunist par
ties reoeiving less than tea per oent of the votes
Soviet polioy on the frontier question had weakened her
position in Germny.

Although the Soviets delayed an-

nminoements# the daamige had already been eaueed by OsubkaMorawski *s statement of Stalin's promise to bank the OderHeisse line with foroe if neoessary.

By the end of the

year, all of the zones held eleotlons.

Sxoept for the

Soviet zone and Berlin, the oommmist vote was less than
tea per oent in the rest of Germany.

In oontrast to their

weakness In western zones, the oommunists doubled their
pereeatage to twenty per oent of the electorate la Berlin,
but that was m t enough to win oontrol.

And in the soviet
40
zone, the sommaists slaimed eighty per oent of the vote.
During Hovember, 194@, the Provisional government

aosused the Polish Peasant Party of so-operating with
"Passist" countries who had denied Poland her western

38.

lane, on sit., p. 253.
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(U.S.) Department of State, Oooupation of Germany,
Policy and Progress. 1946-194%, mropean series S3,
Pubiioaiîon %7iS, August 1947, pp. 57-68.
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«e
territory.*^

M m

thowgh thl# party had objwteé to lyraes*

#pa#@h amd had ampportad th# Oder*B#laa@ lima alma# Yalta,
aamaamlat leadara aallad it pro-fasoiat.

Beaamaa of almi-

lay attaaka, jmbaaaador Lama raammaamdad that the limited
Btataa ramaim allant on the frontier queatiom until after
Poli ah alaatloma.

Lama* a omammniqme read;

Umlaaa we are prepared to maa phyaiaal foree, we
eanmot onilaterally ehange the frontier, and ©nr
eapomaal of the thesis (whioh wee implied if not
aetmally erpresaed im lyraes* Stuttgart speeoh>
that the western frontiers were not to he permamem*
tly Polish made a universally had impression Im
Poland,4*
Although the United States did suffer a severe eethaok with
respeet to prestige im Poland, she gained favor im Germany,
It was obvious that eommunlsta eontrolled Poland, and
therefore, the lest did not influenoe the eleetiom re
sults#

But in western zones of Germany, Great Britain,

the United States, and Erenoe permitted all parties to
equally partioipate in the oempaigos and voting.

Irri

tated by soviet eclipse of Poland and East Germany, the
West determined to prevent this in Western Germany,
On Jemuary 17,

1947, the ommunlst party proclaimed

a sweeping victory im the Polish eleotlons.^

The hopes

for the rise of a free amd independent Poland expressed

41,

Lame,
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Ô7
in th# provlmloa of Yalta and Potadam war# obaolate,

Thar#

vaa mo reaaom amy lomger for aaglo-Amerloam polioy to plao#
Poland over amd above Germany.

Im th# praotleal aemae,

Poland #%lated as a satellite.

Th# soviet ooura# for Poland,

aimo# the early part of the war, was an mndeviatlmg path
toward domination.

Had Roosevelt and oWrohlll realized

Soviet Basai#*# alma and ommamlatlo methods for takln#
over a government, the border mlggit have been settlirà east
of the Oder-Helsse In exohang# for reoognltlon of the
dirzon Line.

At Potsdam, It was too late; Greet Britain

and the United states lost the bargaining power of th#
Ourzon Line by oonoeding to it during the war.

Poland

n^ved in under the ausplees of the 0.S.S.B., and Western
powers saved fee# by agreeing only indireotly to the OderHelsse line, whioh polioy they used later to th# advantage.
In l#4d, the Polish provisional Government of Katlonal
Hnity failed to abide with the Potsdam deolaratlon for
Poland; the Soviet Onion broke the Potsdam pledge by
basking the Pi%visional government; Allied unity broke
down in Germany.

And this was the part of the Cold War

that oaused the oriels of the Qerman-Follsh frontier.

In

war, there is no willing oompromise or aequlesoenoe,
whether It be a politisai or military oonfliot.

And aa

the West revamped their polloiea to prevent the fall of
th# Iron Curtain over Germany, they used every devise
possible.

Among them was the German-polish border question.

C B A P T m IV
BORDER AMD THE FAIUORE TO WRITE A <»HMAM PEAGE TREATY
Be@@m#e it was am establlshad fact by februaiy 1947»
that Polsmd lay wlthlm the soviet orbit, there was mo
reason for the West to soft-pedal Oermsm-Polish frontier
questions.

Diplomatio slashes ooourred throughout the

year, and by Deeember, ne^tietions reached an impasse.
Without four-power agreement, it was impossible to stop
Poland from oooupying and olaiming territories to the
Oder-Melsse; and without a German peace treaty, the west
refused to recognize the border as final.

lOur years

later, Eastern and western opinion remained the same,
negotiations failed, and there was no settlement.
The growing &mst-west dispute did not intimidate
the new Polish government.

Poland maintained she had

recovered land that belonged to her.

After his inaugur

ation, February, 1947, President Blerut appointed a cw&mlseloner for the "Recovered Territories,"^
Poles lived there.

] ^ r million

Of Western insistence for border

changes, he stated:
. . . such a revision w u l d result in unhappy, not
to say dangerous consequences. Millions of people
would have to move agmim— some of thma already have
1.

Poland of Today. Vol. II, Ho. S, March 1947, p.8.

ë#
&##m m v m â two, three, end «vem t m r tlmee âuriag
the peet greare— aisâ aerioms pelltleei mpheavale
m m X Û be oertala to follow . . .
Wqt all praotleal purposes the ease we# eloseâ #*•
eept for the final teehaleallty of legallzlag this
horëer settlement by the term# of e peaee treaty*®
A Iféf ehange we# mot only infeasible, bet also pole#
âeolareâ the border settled at Potsdam.

The new Polish

gowemm#nt reasoned a# follows*
* • * the problem of the Pollsh-Gersen border doe#
not await a solution, for one has already been
agreed upon, The solution, moreover, had been
Implemented by plaolng the former German terri
tories east of the Oder-lelsse line under Polish
administration and by removimg the German Inhabi
tants. Whoever advosate# any ehange In the pre
sent settlement thereby advosate# the revision
of am already established frontier.*
Poland oonslstently followed this position the mart four
yeers.^
To warn the more powerful West of serious eonsequeneee
arising from border revisions w u l d have been fcwlhardy by
Poland without assuranoe of outside help.

But obviously,

the ÏÏ.8.S.B. basked the Polish eommnlst party.

In his

Inaugural address, President Blerut thanked the govlet
tJnlon for her neighborly aid throughout 194i.
the Polish i^vernment announoed*

B*

Ibid*# p. 5*

B*

,i]C|bld*, PP* S—6*
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In April,

T0
. . * It 1# easy to imâeratamd wtoy the mew P o l l #
Premier made the eepltel of the Soviet tlalom the
#eal of his first trip abroad, A stromg amd laetlmg
frlemdehlp blmds polamd amd Soviet Rmssla together.
. , Polamd • . , is still hammted by the fear of re*
mewed Germam aggreealom, amd her frlemdehlp with the
Soviet Gmlom appears to her the best gmaramtee amd
proteetiom agalmst this dsmger.®
There was mo seeret, Polamd amd the G.S.s.R, were bommd im
elose frlemdship, amd polamd feared Germam irrldemtlam.
By Imsletlmg that the Big Three, at Potsdam, Imtemded
the Oder*Heisse lime as the future border, Polamd wms
oorreot.

mt

Imtemtloms are mot gsaramtees, amd the

Umlted states amd Great Britaia were free to support what
ever fromtler they desired at the peaee oomferemee.

Byrmes*

threat amd the approval whioh it reoeived im Qermamy eaueed
Polish warmlmgs of the firmmess amd foroe of soviet support.
Amglo-Amerlearn polioy revlsioms, the last half of 194S, did
mot push Polamd toward the soviet Bmiom.
ready there.

Polamd was al

lUt Westarm polioy gave her a ohoioe:

either

fulfill Potsdam pledges with regard to eleotloms amd wlm
Westarm frlemdship also, or Igmore agreememts amd fees
Westarm oppositlom.

Polamd took the latter oourse.

Im the sprimg, the foreigm mimlsters of Pramoe, Great
Brltalm, the Soviet Gmlom, amd the timlted states met Im

5.

polamd of Today. Vol. II, No. 4, April, 194?, p. 16.

n
Mofldov*

Marshall^ elaborated om %rmee* state*

meat and proposed the following;
. . . southern last Prussia should heoome Polish
territory. G e r m n Upper Silesia end its industrial
oo^plex should also heoome Polish, hut there should
be land available to help sustain the eoonony of
mrope. The division of the remaining territory,
whioh is largely agrioulturel land, required eon*
sidération of the meeds of the Polish and German
peoples and of Birope ms a whole.
Im order for million people to live in reduoed
Germny, ahe will have to heoome more Industrial*
ined. Danger of oreating irridentist feelings
would he prasemt if the Oder-Neisse line beeame
final.?
Be also suggested forming a eoimission to make reoomien*
dations on the new border.®
Marshall questiomM the praotioality of giving
Poland agrioulturel areas between Upper Silesia and
Danzig, when he stated;
Qermmn pre*war Imports of foodstuffs had providWl
about one*fifth of the total food oonsumed in
Germany. Before the war, the German area j^w under
provisional Polish oontrol also eontributed over a
fifth of Germany's total food supply. If Germany
anst, ia the future. Import two*fifths or more of

d.

George Gat let mrshall (1880*
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the United States Army, he served as cmief of Staff,
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pp. 145*148.
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Ibid.. pp. 145*148.

her fooâ empply from abroad, the Qermam eeomwy would
here to be iadustrlaiized to an ever greater extent
than before the war or Germany would beeome a eon*
geeted slum In the oenter of @urope.*
Althou#i Pranee traditionally hated Germany, she agreed
with the Ameriean point of view#

The Frenoh attitude was

a reversal of her position in 1945.

Then, Pranoe aeeepted

without protest the implieation that the Oder-Heisse line
would be final.

Now Pranee realized the danger in requir

ing an inoreased German population to live within deoreased
t Britain
I
a r e a s , A n d Great
was in aoeord with the United
States and Pranee.

11

In reply to Marshall, Molotov reiterated Polish argu
ments for the Oder-Heisse line.

The possibilities of

German industrial expansion and the rise of irridentima
did not bother the Soviet Union.

In Hovmaber, at the

London meeting of the Counoil, the deedloek eontinued.
Molotov vetoed plans for a eommission.

12

Between 1948 and 1950, a pesos oonferenoe did not oonvene beoeuse the four powers failed to aohieve eoonomie
unity in Oermsny.

9. Ibid.. pp^
10.

Hoonomio unity never matured beoause of

145*148.

Ibid.. pp.

146-148.

11. Ibid.. pp.

146-148.

12. (U.S. ) Department o:

Gomtlm&ea aim@#r#ement om reparations*

During t&la

period, the Oermam-Pollsh border question deoXined in importanee for it beoame evident that Qerman^r lost an even
larger area, the soviet none*

Germany was virtually

divided in two, and by 1981, a four power pease settlement
seemed Impossible.
The Soviet Dnion still maintained that reparations
from Oexnmny should be ezaoted in the form of dollars,

ior

Poland and Soviet Bussia, the prloe was ten billion at 1988
values.

In the f o m of 1947 German production, it would

take Gersmny at least twenty years to pay.

"It implied

/sio7 the establishment of an eoonomio power so comprehen
sive that it wcntld be in reality a power of life and death
over any German

G o v e r n m e n t .

©eoretary Marshall summarized

the Western viewpoint as follows;
. . . we are confronted with a dmiand for repara
tions in exoess of the Potsdam agre^ent which would
make a Gmrman government subservient to its repara
tions creditor. It is therefore clear that agree
ment can be reached only under conditions which
would not only enslave the German people but would
seriously retard the recovery of all lurope.*^
Before a peace oonferenoe for Germany could be con
sidered, it was essential that German internal conditions
provide a sound basis for the foimatlon of a ^ v e m m e n t ,

13.

Ibid.. pp. 193-198.

14.

Ibid.. pp. 193-195*

n
Th# eeomomlo ohaoe, created by the reparations issue, was
umsoumd for a new government.

Thus the West rejected soviet

proposals for the esteblislment of a strong Oentral govern*
m«it*^®

AS long as reparations remained unsettled and no

authority existed to control soviet unilateral actions, a
German peace treaty was out of the question.^®
Between March 50, 1948, and May 4, 1949, the Soviet
Union tried to oust the West from Berlin.

Since 1949, Western

powers tried to obtain currency reform for all of Gemany.
The Soviet Union interpreted the suggestion as interference
In her nones, and plans never materialized.

As an economic

necessity, the West introduced financial reforms into their
zones.

In retaliation, the soviet Union Issued restrictive

measures on transportation going in and out of western Berlin,
zones.

All communications between western Berlin and other

Western zones halted in July.

The soviet Union denounced

these measures as harmful because she claimed the intro
duction of the Western mark into Berlin destroyed the Soviet
19
zones* economy.

15.

15.

(U.S.) Department of State, Q e j y ny 1949-1949, jg|e
Story in Documents. European and British Commonwealth
Series 9, Publication 3556, March 1950, pp. 64-69.

19.

Ibid.. pp. 202-223. For further information, See;
Lucius D. Clay, Decision In Germany (Mew Iork,^ 6 0 ) ,
pp. 358-392.
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Darlmg the mmct year# aegotlatlooa proved to be abor
tive.

Bamala** aolmtlom required soviet oomtrol of Berllm

ourreac^.

18

Without the Weateru gigantie airlift program

Chreat Britain, Irauee# and the Halted states sould have had
to ooaoede to the Soviet llaioa.
the four power» eomproaised.

After a year mad a half#

They issued oaly Soviet

mirreaey ia Berlin, but it was under ooatrol of the four
powers.

The eompromise still left the ourreaey problem
19
open for future reform.
It was olearly a western victory
by which Soviet Russia lost prestige in Geimsay.

However,

the dispute revealed Ü.S.S.R. Intentions to bring Germany
within the Soviet sphere by any means.
The failure to achieve German economic unity, the
Soviet barrier between Eastern and Western zones, and the
Berlin Crisis produced a decided stiffness la Western policy,
a determination to stop Soviet advance even if it meant war,
and the rise of a new Germany.

The BOrth Atlantic Treaty

Organization was the result, in which western countries of
Burope plus the United states, Canada, and Iceland estabgA
llshed machinery for the formation of a mropean Army.
During the same year of 1949, the west formed a German

18.

Ibid.. pp. 202-223.

19.

Ibid., pp. 202-223.

80.

(U.S.) Department of State, Participation of the

p
lM
Publication

Mwasai M

MMSmss,»

4591, ReleasedOotobar, 1958, pp. 20-31.

Vë
fmà&r&l

ereateâ oui; of the three «estera zones.

la Mey of the following year, Pranee Introâueeë the sehemaa
Plea «hleh proposed to merge la a single max^et, German end
Preaoh ooal and steel Industries with those of say other
mropeaa oouatry.®*

It Is slgalflesnt that the Halted States

and not soviet Russia partlolpeted In these plans,

fhe for

mer intended to stay la ISurope and mot leave Germany to de
fault.

Even without a German pease treaty, the western

powers oontlnued with the German political and eoonomie
reoovery program.
The loss of Russian prestige eaa best be expressed ^
the failure of the eommmlst party in western zones.

#ea

the Soviet authorities Imposed a land blookade on Berlin,
the fortunes of the ocxsmuniat party In western Germany
deollned beoause the German people held the oommmlsts
responsible for the hardships inf listed on the oltlzens of
Berlin.

The week alibis presented by the oommnlsts In

justlfloatlon of the blookade made little Is^resslon on
the German publie.

The munlolpal and county eleetlons la

North Rhine Westphalia and In Sohleswlg-Bolsteln In Ootober,
%
1948, showed the waning of somaunlmm. T h ^ polled 7.8 per
sent of the votes in Narth Rhine Westphalia and S.3 per sent
01.

(U.S.) Department of State, Qenaany 1947-1949. The
Story in Doouments. European and British doWonwsalth
Series 9, PsfflToatloa 3SSë, Marsh 1950, pp. 279-305.

22,

(O.S.) Department of state, in ^alysls of the
Schuman Plan, lurcq?ean and British O a m m n w e ^ t n
Series 23, Publication 4175, April 1961, pp. 3-8.

n

iQ S o h l e m w l t e l m , oompared with 15.9 per eemt and 4.7
per dent reepeetively la 1947 la the same areas,

fhe

oommmlsts suffered a similar loss at the mualolpal amd
oouaty eleotloas la Lower saxoay the same year.

Ia 19B0,

there was a further drop la eomsualet strength.^
Oa Juae 6 . 1980, the asst Oermaa Gorerameat oeded
thlrty-alme thoussad square miles to polaad.^*

This ual-

laterel aotloa was the seeoad Soviet attempt to seoure the
Oder-Heisse border for Polaad.

If it was meaat to intimi

date or force a Western mbmisslon, the Soviet program
failed,

fhe United States and Great Britain protested the

aotloa as violating Potsdam oommltmeats.
reiterated their pledges to Poland.

Bit the West also

They again promised

revisions la Poland's favor to the north and west at the
peace oonferenoe.^®
There was a stronger reaction la Germany.

The German

Federal Government, on Jhne 9, formally rejected the agree
ment between Poland and the eastern Soviet zone and Issued
a statement declaring all agréments entered into by the
last G e m a n government null end void, and denied the
eg
letter the right to speak la the name of the German people.

S3.

(U.S.) Office of the High Oosmissioner For Germany,
Report on Germany. September SI, 1949 - Jhly 31, 1932,
pip. li-W.

24.

New York Times, July 7, 1950, p. 10.

25.

Ibid.. pp. 18-22.

26.

New York Times. July 1 0 , 1950, p. 1 2 .
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Th# day after the agreement, ten thousand German refngees
from eastern territories protested soviet aotlon,^^ fhe
mayor of West Berlin dealered that:

"an understanding on

the border must be made between a free Germany and a free
88

Poland and not one that is ruled by the soviet Marshall. "
At Hanover, fifty thousand refugees, having been driven
froa Silesia, met in protest.

One hundred aommunist leaders

who opposed the Kremlin’s foreign polloy formed the Indepen
dent Demooratla party and rejeeted the East G e r œ m govern
ment’s agremsent to renounee all territories east of the
89
Oder-Heleee line.
with the favor she gained In Poland,
the U. 8 .8 .R. lost just as much in Germany.
fhe Western foreign ministers met in Mew fork during
September.

They oonsidered using a German army In the

MOrth Atlantis Treaty Organization.

In November, the

soviet Union suggested a meeting of the four powers be
held to dlsouss German disarmament.

The United states was

not willing to oall a oonferenoe, and in a note she stated:
. . . We find it somewhat extraordinazy that the
Soviet Goveriment should be so eager that this
meeting be held promptly. The Soviet G&vemmeat
delayed over five months, its reply to our m t e of
last May oalllng upon the soviet authorities in
Geraany to disband the extmisive and heavily armed
paramilitary foroes, whioh they have oreated In the

27.

Ibid., p. 12.

28.

Ibid.. p. ©.

89.

Ibid,, p . 6•
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meterrn z o m • . . Q#rmmny is not a problem which can
be isolated from the context of similar areas of ten
sion elsewhere.30
On December B2, the three powers seat soviet Russia
identical notes which maintained that German participation
in the Western European defense plans was not the oaly cause
of world tension.

Finally In February the soviet Union agreed

to discuss other matters at the conference.

The foreign

deputies met in Paris from March to May and could not agree
on an agenda.

The possibility of a final peace treaty for
SI
Germany was out of the question at that time.
The period between 1947 and 19S1 produced nothing
toward the German peace treaty and hence, the settlement

of the German-Pollsh border question.

During the four years,

the West maintained that they did not consider the OderHeisse frontier as final, and that it could not be so as
sumed until the German peace treaty was signed.

Hor did

the West recognize the unilateral actions of soviet Russia,
but they were powerless to prevent the Soviets from giving
thirty-nine thousand square miles to the Poles.

In all

practical respects, except for international recognition,
howiver, the border was final.

And therefore, the German-

Polish boundary lost its importance as a frontier problem.

30.

Ibid.. p. 6.

31.

(U.S.} Department of state, Department of state
Bulletin. Vol.
XI, Ho.
rol. ZI,
NO. 889, Publication 2499,
SayTlitl, pp. 489-468.
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Bit as a politioel weapoa. It played a great part la Western
polloy to halt the spread of soviet laflaenee la Qermaay.
And this Is how the Germaa-Po 11 sh border will remain along
the Oder-Meisse until the German peace treaty la signed.

CRAPTgR V
00NGLD8I0M
The thirty-nine thousand miles of disputed territory
ehioh Poland has eontrolled sines the end of the ear will
be eomditioned by three faotors if there is a settlement ;
eeonomioa, irredentism, and atelinigm.
from the eoonomie standpoint, the border must be ad
justed so that both Polish and German finaneial stability
in world trade earn enable their inhabitants to produoe a
living.

It la essential that Poland should have Danzig be-

oanse that seaport is the natural outlet for the Vistula
River.

The Vistula Basin is the heart of Poland by whioh

her inland produets are transported to the sea.

Beoause

the U.S.B.R. has taken Konlgsberg in Bast Prussia, Danzig
and Gdynia are the only other major seaports on the Bel tie
that Poland oould have.

It would m>t be a loss for Germany

beoause she has many western ports.
the only main seaport for Poland.

Bit Danzig would be
The Amerioan plan in-

eluded a ooastline of one hundred miles west along the
Baltic for Poland*

Germany oould do without this also.

Poland is low on raw materials for industry.
virtually an a^icultural producing area.

She is

Upper Silesia,

with the ooal potentiality would help to balance Polish
economy so that she would not have to depend entirely upon

82
export# for industrial raw materials.

Germany does not need

ooal or the Industries of Silesia as mioh as agrioultural
produoing areas whioh are essential to her eoonomy,

Ger

many*# main home souree for foodstuffs before the war was
the seetlon between Danzig in the north and Upper Silesia
in the south.

If Germany were to lose this permanently,

she would have to import two-fifths of her foodstuffs.

And

to do this, she mmst then inerease her industrial output by
one-fifth of her 1936 level to balanoe her trade.

With the

expulsion of about six million Germans out of this area
sines the war end about five million Poles from east of the
(Mrzon Line, both Germany and Poland have the problem of
supporting a larger population on redueed areas.

Although

Poland does not need the area east of the Oder-Meisse for
her agrioultural produotion, she does meed room for her
people.

And of oourse, Germany has the same problem,

fhe

United States wanted to set up a ooamisslon to investigate
the oondltions here with the idea that the territory would
be divided some way between Poland Qemai^.

For these

reasons, only a partial border oan be determined at the
present.

Danzig and Upper Silesia should go to Poland, and

the agrioultural area divided between Qenaany and Poland by
a oommlasion.
But eooncHaio oonsi derat ions alone would not assure a
stable frontier.

If Germany's loss were too great, she

might again use it as an exouse for aggression.

Althou#i

80
G e m a a j owned Danzig and the corridor from 1798 to 1914,
Hitler*8 Danzig ambition# were provoked by the desire to
link last Pressla with the Fatherland,

How that last Prussia

Is divided between Poland and the U.s.s.R,, there will be no
geo#paphl@@l excuse, that all of Germany*# territory should
be linked together.

But Upper Silesia belonged to Prussia

since 1740; actually, from an historical point of view,
German irredentism could work up a case for Danzig, Silesia,
and the agricultural area between.

German Irredentism fed

by m, unstable economy would be dangerous and a cause for
future disputes over the Qerman-Poliah frontier.

However, if

the Poles gave Germany enough land to help with her food
stuffs problem, the effect of German loss elsewhere might be
amdlfled.
Bit the whole decision rests on the will of the Soviet
Union.

The United states, Great Britain, and % a n c e are

unable to move the border, without going to war.
U.S.S.B. has several alternatives.

The

She oould win French

support, perhaps, for the Oder-Nelsee line by backing Frenoh
annexation of the Saar at the Peace Conference.

Because

Poland is a Soviet satellite, the soviet Uplon could com
promise with Germans In hopes of gaining Influence In
Germany.

However, placing Germany over Poland would probably

be unsuccessful because Germans have shown by elections they
do not like comminlsm in any form.
evident to the Soviet Union.

And German attitude Is

If she had thought there was

84
a ahamae for oomamnlam amd Soviet Inflmenoe In Oermamy,
the

vouid not have foroed the Beat zone to eede

the area to Poland la 1950#
Vnlon will do nothing.

It la probably that the Soviet

If there ia a German peaee treaty

in the near future, the ïï.s.s.R. oan insist on the Allies
reaognizing the Oder-Reiaae as final beoause the soviet
Union has military eomend of the area end she has moved
in millions of Poles who are already settled.

Unless

Russia oan obtain a better trade on some other question
at the peace conference, the Oder*Reisse is the final
border between Germany and Poland until the next war.
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à Partial

Text of the protoool oT the prooeedlxge of the
Yalta Oomfereaee
V.

Reparation

The following protocol has been approved:
1# Germany must pay In kind for the loaeae caused hy
her to the Allied nations In the course of the war. Repara
tions are to be received in the first Instance by those
countries which have bourne the main burden of the war, have
suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over
the enmay,
2. Reparation In kind la to be exacted from Germany
In three following forma:
a) Removals within two years from the surrender of
Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the
national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany
herself as well as outside her territory {equipment, machinetools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares
of Industrial, transport and other enterprises In Germany etc.),
these removals to be carried out chiefly for purposes of
destroying the war potential of Germany.
b) Annual deliveries of goods from current produc
tion for a period to be fixed.
c) Use of German labour.
3. For the working out on the above principles of
a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an
Allied Reparation Commission will be set up In Moscow. It
will consist of three representatives— one from the Union of
Soviet 8.R., one from the UK
andone from the USA.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the
reparation as well as the distribution of It among the coun
tries which suffered from the German aggression the soviet and
Merlcan delegations agreed as follows:
"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take In Its
Initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of
the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation
la accordance with the point
(a) and (b) of the paragraph 2
should be 2 0 billion dollars and that 50$ of It should go to
the Union of soviet 8.R.
The British delegation was of the opinion that pend
ing consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow
Reparations Commission as one of the proposals to be con
sidered by the Commission.
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711#

Poland

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Con
ference:
A new eituatlon hee been oreeted in Poland ae a
reenlt of her ooe^lete liberation by the Red Army. Thie
ealle for the eetabliahment of a polish Provlalonal Govern»
ment whioh oan be more broadly baaed than warn possible before
the recent liberation of western part of Poland. The Provi
sional Government whioh is now functioning in Poland should
therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with
the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and
from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be
called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and sir A. Clark Kerr are
authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance
in Moscow with m w b e r s of the present Provisional Govern
ment and with other Polish democratic leaders from within
Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization
of the present Government along the above lines. This
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be
pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as
soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and
secret ballot. In these elections ell democratic and
anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and
to put forward candidates.
When a polish Provisional Government of National
Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above,
the Government of the U88B, which now maintains diplomatic
relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland,
and the Government of the UK and the Government of the USA
will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity, end will exchange
Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will
be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the
lastern frontier of Poland should follow the Ourzon Line
with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight
kilometres ia favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland
must receive substantial accessions of territory in the
North and West, They feel that the opinion of the new
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions
and that the final delimitations of the western frontier
of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.
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A Partial Text of the Potadam
Deelermtlom
IV.
1.

Beparatioas

Rapmratioaa elalms of the U 88 R shall be met by removal#
from the zone of Germaay oooupied by the U8S3R aad from
appropriate German external eaeete,
8 * The ÜSSB undertakes to settle the reparation elalms of
Poland from it# own share of reparations.
3. The reparation elalms of the United states, the United
Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall
be met from the western zones and from appropriate German
external assets.
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR
from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive
additionally from the Western Zones:
(A) IB percent of
such usuable and complete industrial capital equipment, in
the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine
manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German
peace economy and should be r«moved from the western zones
of Germany, ia exchange for an equivalent value of food,
coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum pro
ducts, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.
(B) 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment as
is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be
rwaoved from the western zones, to be transferred to the
Soviet Government on reparations account without payment
or exchange of any kind in return.
Removals of equipment as provided in (A) and (B)
above shall be made simultaneously.
5. The aimunt of equipment to be removed from the western
zones on account of reparations must be determined within
six sE^nths from now at the latest.
6 . Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as
soon as possible and shall be completed within two years
from the determination specified in paragraph 5, The de
livery of products covered by 4(A) above shall begin as
soon as possible end shall be made by the USSR in agreed
installments within five years of the date hereof. The
determination of the amount and character of the industrial
capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy
end therefore available for reparations shall be made by
the control council under policies fixed by the Allied
Ooomiselon of Reparations, with the participation of
France, subject to the final approval of the zone com
mander in the zone from which the equipment is to be
removed.

94
7» Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment sub
ject to remoTel, edrenoe deliveries shall be made in reepeot
of suoh equipment ae will be determined to be eligible for
delivery in aeoordanoe with the procedure set forth in the
last eentenee of paragraph Ô.
8, The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of
r^aratlons to shares of German enterprises which are located
in the western zones of occupation in Germany as well as to
German foreign assets in all cwintries except those specified
in paragraph 9 below.
9* The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United
States of America renounce their claims in respect of repara
tions to shares of German enterprises lAich ere located in
the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to
German foreign assets In Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary,
Rumania and Eastern Austria#
10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured
by the Allied troops in Germany,
VI.
City of Koenlgsberg and Adjacent Area
The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet
Government that pending the final determination of terri
torial questions at the peace settlement the section of the
western frontier of the Union of soviet socialist Republics
which is adjacent to the Baltic sea should pass from a point
of the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north
of Braunsberg-Qoldep, to the meeting point of the frontiers
of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and Bast Prussia.
The conference has agreed in principle to the pro
posal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate
transfer to the soviet Union of the City of Eoenigsberg and
the area adjacent to it as described above subject to ex
pert examination of the actual frontier.
The President of the United states end the British
Prime Minister have declared that they will support the
proposal of the conference at the forthcoming peace
settlement.
II.
Poland
the Polish provisional Government of Rational
Unity they defined their attitude in the following statement:
A. We have taken note with pleemire of the agreement reached
among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has

fS
mma# poeaible the formation, In aooordanoe with the deeisiona
reaehed at the Crimea Oonferenoe, of a Polish Provisional
Gtoverittaeat of National Unity reoognized hy the three powers,
fhe eatahllatment by the British and United States Govern
ments of diplomatie relations with the Polish Provisional
Goverm&ent has resulted in the withdrawal of their recog
nition from the former Polish Government in London, whloh
no longer exists.
The British end United States Governments have taken
measures to protect the Interest of the Polish Provisional
Government as the recognized government of the Polish state
In the property belonging to the polish state located in
their territories and under their control, whatever the form
of this may be. They have further taken measures to prevent
alienation to third parties of such property. All proper
facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Govern
ment for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for
the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State
which may have been wrongfully alienated.
The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish
Provisional Government In facilitating the return to Poland
as soon as practicable of all poles abroad who wish to go,
including members of the Polish armed forces and the
Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return
home shall be accorded p ersonal and property rights on the
same basis as all Polish citizens.
The three powers note that the Polish Provisional
Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea
Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered
elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal
suffrage and secret ballot in whioh all dmsocratic and
anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to
put forward candidates, and that representatives of the
Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the
imrld upon developments in Poland before and during the
elections
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached
at the Crimea Conference the three heads of government have
sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity in regard to the Accession of territory in
the north end west which Poland should receive. The presi
dent of the National Council of Poland and members of the
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been
received at the Conference and have fully presented their
views. The three heads of government reaffirm their opin
ion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of
Poland should await the pemoe settlement.
The three heads of government agree that, pending
the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the
former German territories east of a line running from the
Baltic Sea immWiately west of Swlnemunde, and thence along
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the Oder Hirer to the oomflwemee of the west era Neleee Hirer
aad aloag the restera Mel see to the Czeohoelorek frontier,
laeladiag that portion of gaet Prasaia not placed under the
admialstratiom of the Union of sorlet socialist Hepuhlice
ia accordance with the understanding reached at this con
ference and including the area of the former free City of
Danzig, shall he under the administration of the Polish
State and for such purposes should not he considered as
part of the sorlet zone of occupation in Germany.
31II.
Orderly Transfers of German Populations
The conference reached the following agreement on
the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and
HungaryÎ
The three governments haring considered the question
in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany
of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining la
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be under
taken. They agree that any transfers that take place
should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.
Since the influx of a large number of Germans
into Germany would increase the burden already resting on
thecBccupylag authorities, they consider that the Allied
Control Council in Germany should in the first instance
examine the problem with special regard to the question
of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the
several zones of occupation. They are accordingly in
structing their respective representatives on the Control
Council to report to their goveriments as soon as possible
the extent to whioh such persons have already entered
Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to
submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further
transfers could be carried out, having regard to the
present situation in Germany.
The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional
Ctovernaent end the Control Council in Hungary are at the
same time being infoimied of the above, and are being re
quested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending
the examination by the governments concerned of the report
from their representatives on the Control Council.

